Transferring Managerial Competence and Organization from Western to Eastern Europe by Makó, Csaba
University o f  G lasgow  Business School 
Department o f M anagem ent Studies 
53-59 Southpark Avenue 
G 12 8LF 
Scotland UK
R e se a r c h  O u tp u t
(Final Report)
(Study supported by Research Fellowship grant of the European Commission - 
Award from the Phare ACE Programme 1995)
Proposal No. P95-2625-F
Csaba MAKO
Center for Social Conflict Research 
Hungarian Academy o f Sciences 
1068 Budapest 
Benczur u. 33. - Hungary
Budapest, January 1997
IContents
Acknowledgement
Introduction
Mainstream Approaches on the Transformation Process and the 
Questions Investigated
References
1. Erosion of the "Soviet-Type" model of Organising Economic  
Activity: the Case of the Hungarian Economic Reform Process
I I New Econom ic Reform (1968) and Its Impact. Increasing Diversity 
in M anagerial and Organisation Practice in Econom ic Activities
1.2 Reforms within the Socialist System: An Attem pt to Com bine 
Hierarchies and M arkets
1.3 M icro-Flexibility and M acro-Rigidity: Lessons from the Experiences 
with 'in side  Contracting G roups1' (VGM K'S) (Period o f  1980's)
1.4 Increasing Autonom y o f  M anagement: the Case o f  the Enterprise 
Councils (1985-1990)
References
2. Collapse of the State Socialist Political-Economic Regime and the 
Emerging Market Economies in CEE Countries
2 .1 Converging and Diverging Tendencies o f  Institution Building in the 
Post-Socialist Countries: the Case o f  Privatisation
Appendix / □
Appendix 2
References
3. Overestimating the Role of Privatisation in Conversion from the 
Planned to Market Economy in the Countries of CEE
3 .1 Antecedents o f  Privatisation: Restructuring the Hungarian Enterprise 
M anagement System  in the 1980's
3.2 Is privatisation M agic Tool in the Process o f  Transform ation?
3.3 Transfer o f M anagerial Skill and Organisation and the 'Knowledge 
Deficiency M odel’
References
1
2
2
I I
13
13
20
24
30
34
36
36
43
44
45
46
46
50
52
58
II
4. Speeding-up the Transfer of Managerial Skill and Organisation 60
from Western to Eastern Europe: Special Focus 011 Hungary
4.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as “Core Facilitator' o f  T ransferring 60
‘M arket-Standard1 Knowledge and Organisation
4.2 Uneven Developm ent o f  the Managerial Learning Process: Lessons 66
from the ’H okkaido Project'
4.3 Facilitators o f  the N ew  Managerial M ethods: C o-operative Patterns 71
o f  Labour Relations in the Hungarian Firms
4 4 Consulting Firms and Joint-V entures as Core Vehicles o f  78
Transferring M anagerial Skill and Organisation
4.4.1 W estern Consulting Firms as Vehicles o f  the New M anagerial SO
Skill and Organisation
4.4.2 Joint-V entures as Tools o f Transferring M anagerial Skill and 85
Organisation
4 .4 .2 .1 The Case o f  the A ustro-Hungarian Cold-Rotling Mill: H ow  89
to Fit New M anagem ent A pproaches with the Old Ones
4.4.2.2 Com bination o f  Local and International Experiences: the 95
Case o f  a MNC Operating in the Electric and Electronic 
Industrial Sector
Notes 99
References 100
5. Strategic Privatisation: Speed-up Re-organisation of Economic 104
Activity and Managerial Learning Process
5.1 Privatisation: Creating Real Owners and M anagers 104
*
5.2 Variety in Forms o f  Privatisation Facilitates the Diffusion o f  N ew  107
M anagerial Techniques and Organisations. Green-Field Sites as the 
’Leading-Edge' M ethods o f  M anagem ent
References 116
Conclusions 118
References 124
Acknowledgement
I am grateful for the support and help o f my colleagues at the University o f 
Glasgow Business School, Department o f Management Studies in preparing the 
‘Interim’ and this ‘Final Report’. 1 learned much from the Seminar organised by 
Universities o f Glasgow and Strathclyde on ^Industrial Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe” (25th October, 1996) and I gained much from the discussions o f  my 
working papers with colleagues at the Department o f Management Studies. In 
particular I am indebted to Professor Roderick Martin, and Dr. Chris W arhurst for their 
advice and detailed comments at various stages during my research at Glasgow.
I would also like to thank the permanent assistance of the staff members o f the 
Department o f Management Studies, especially Andrea Douglas, Kristen Daily and 
Peter Davidge. I would express my gratitude for the access to the excellent library of 
the Glasgow University and for the continuous consulting possibilities at the Institute 
of Russian and East European Studies.
I also wish to gratefully acknowledge the support by „Research Fellowship 
Grant o f the European Commission - Award from the Phare ACE Programme 1995” to 
enable me to begin work on the research that has led eventually to this ‘Final Report’. 
Special thanks to M arc Ellingstad, Fulbright Scholar, who reviewed the English text.
2Introduction
Motto: „For only the explicit, forinulable core of knowledge 
can be transferred, neutrally from person to person." 
Polanyi Michael (1969) Knowing and Being, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul
Mainstream Approaches on the Transformation Process and the Questions Investigated
economists and political scientists - observing and advising the transition process from 
planned to market economy of formerly socialist countries o f Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) - regarded the change as being from one type of socio-economic regime \ .
to another type ignoring any mstitutional continuity! The transition was interpreted as 
"an once-and-for-all shift from political-economic regimes based on the logic o f the ) 
central planning to another political-economic regime based on the logic o f the market. 
(For instance, the notion of transition was so popular among Hungarian social 
scientists that m the first years of the 1990’s a forum was called ^Transit Club” 
established to discuss various aspects o f the transformation process.)
Transition means radical (100 per cent) break with the social and economic 
institutions o f the ex-socialist system and the creation o f brand new institutions, 
patterns o f behaviour o f social and economic agents. The new system gives the society 
a development potential, where the old system was throughly exhausted. This 
approach is often characterised by the „0” sum game model o f society, according to 
this logic, the triumph of one social-economic system implies complete failure of the 
other one. Assuming incompatibility between social systems excludes any continuity 
of former patterns o f social relations and their perspective institutions. The societal 
developments seem to be following according to the rationality o f revolution: without 
complete destruction of the old institutions it is 
new institutions o f the market economy.
almost impossible to create the genuine
oJ
This view of transition is related to a variety o f other concepts. Firstly, it 
proposes the legacy o f  the socialist past represents only institutional deficiency and 
limits the speed of the transition process. Secondly, it overestimated the level o f  
coherence (or homogeneity) o f  institutions in the former social-economic regime and 
neglects the diversity o f regulations governing both individual and collective actions. 
(Mako-Simonyi, 1992:36-41). Thirdly, this view of „tum-key” capitalism 
underestimates the importance o f  time fo r  the social learning process in creating 
market economy of consistent institutions in the post-socialist countries of CEE. 
Based on his comparative study of the past and present development of the former 
GDR and Hungaiy, Grabher criticised the above mentioned mainstream transition 
approach: „The vision of Central Eastern Europe future is shaped by images of 
Western Europe’s and North America’s present ... and this basically teleological 
development concept o f changes anticipates future society which is not only desirable, 
but already known.” (Grabher, 1995: 33.) or using another well known expression the 
„End of History” .
The other more balanced approach concerning the changes o f 1990’s refutes the 
„social tabula rasa” or „institutional vacuum” arguments o f the transition approach. 
This second approach stresses the importance of the transformation process, in which 
the political and economic institutions, patterns o f social actors’ behaviour are R e­
combined” with some elements of the old institutional configuration. It is argued by 
recognising the role o f „path-dependence” in the emergence of the new institutions of 
the market economy (for instance, privatisation, emerging new labour relations system, 
governance structures o f the firm, etc.) we may better understand the variety of 
trajectories and forms o f development in the post-socialist countries. (Stark, 1992., 
Hausner-Jessop-Nielsen, 1995., Stark-Grabher, 1996.) As one representative o f the 
evolutionary development noticed, „The path-dependent emergence of a new, post­
socialist form of capitalism calls for a complex evolutionary interpretation of this, 
great transformation, as opposed to the big bang view, as the metaphor itself suggests 
forgot that something historical was there before. (Chavance, 1995: 288.)
Using the p roduction  models” of the so-called ‘regulation school’ in 
economics, diere is not only one „efficient” production model even in the capitalist 
system, the same efficiency could be reached by the combination of ‘pure local’, 
‘intermediary’ and ‘universal’ models of production system. (Boyer-Freysennet, 1996.) 
The basic differences between transition and transformation are not only theoretical^ 
but also have significant effects on the success o f economic restructuring of the 
country concerned. As a specialist of the macro-economic development has noticed 
recently, „In the course o f the reconstruction period, the customary, the already-known 
and well-practiced are re-established, such that old skills can efficiently be used. The 
contrary is true for the transformation periods. They require the acceptance of the new 
and different, the acquisition of new skill, and the dissemination of these elements.” 
(Bekker, 1995:105.)
In evaluating both theoretical and empirical evidence related to the transfer o f  
managerial competence and organisation, our analysis represents a combination of 
„path dependence” approach with the significant creative role o f the social actors. In 
this way we try to avoid the risk o f a social-cultural determinism, often associated with 
the „path-dependence” approach. This normative position employed in transformation 
of managerial labour process could be labelled as „social constructivism” (Dubois,
1994.). This approach treats institutions as socially constructed which are at least in 
the short run resistant to change and during the change, social actors must take into 
consideration as constraints. Contrary to the „social realist” view which assumes that 
reality is given ‘out there’ in the world, the „social constructivisf’ approach insists that 
the reality is constructed by human minds interacting in social institutions, which by 
definition consist o f cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by 
various carriers - cultures, structures and routines - and they operate of multiple leveL-^ 
at jurisdiction” (Scott, 1995:33.)
Until recently, most discussion and debate about the post-socialist economies in 
the countries of CEE has been dominated by the issues related to the transformation of 
the political (legal) and economic institutions (e.g. models o f privatisation, creation of 
democratic political system, restructuring the existing welfare system etc.) and the 
roles o f the political and social actors in this process. Nowadays, we may assist a well
publicised debate on the EU integration concentrating mainly on the fulfilment o f tire 
necessary technical requirements. Rather less attention has been paid to the role of 
management as a labour process and the related issues o f  changing skill and 
organisational morphology in the emerging market economies in the countries o f CEE. 
This relative negligence of the role and the work of such key economic actors as 
managers in the ‘every-day life’ in the transformation economies can be explained 
partly by the overestimation of changes in the ownership structure (privatisation) and 
partly by the interest o f social scientists in the role o f the economic elite in the new 
society (e.g., status conversion, social composition, etc.)
Several studies have tned to identify the particular features of the post-socialist 
managerial class opposed to the business elite in the matured market economies. One 
influential group of scholars tries to identify the particular characteristics of the post­
socialist managerial class compared with o f mangers in the developed market 
economies. These scholars speak of the rise of a distinctive form of capitalism, so- 
called „managerial capitalism”, where managers are in a strong power position 
compared with the power of the new prrvate owners. In this view, the dominant feature 
of the „managerial capitalism” in the post-socialist countries is that the economic elite 
is more dependent on the political elite compared with die private owners in matured 
capitalism (e.g., recruitment, nomination, firing the members o f the business elite in 
these countries heavily influenced by the ruling political elite.) (Szelenyi-Kovacs
1995.). The other group o f scholars is treating managers as the simple executive „arm” 
of the new (private) owners in the business organisations (Maximov, 1996.) According 
to our view, it is too early to qualify the nature o f capitalism in the post-socialist 
countries o f CEE. The briefly presented approaches dealing with the post-socialist 
business elite are treating management as a unitary concept, and the singular 
‘frontier o f control between management and workers’ is located at operational level. 
The concept o f a differentiated management with separate rationalises does create a 
more complex and differentiated approach for those who seek to combine theory and 
practice." (Teulings, 1986: 143.) Only systematic empirical studies on the decision 
making system and the labour process of management in the business organisation 
representing the variety o f ownership structures could inform us about the power 
distributions between managers and owners or between managers and the political 
elite.
In spite of the understandable shortcomings of the briefly presented attempts, 
these approaches, however, have called the attention of management scientists to the 
complexity o f the transformation process in the post-socialist countries. Until now,
6relatively modest efforts have been made to understand and evaluate die nature of 
changes in the managerial labour process, which is the core topic o f our study. Our 
approach fits well into the framework of organisational structuralism. „In tliis 
perspective, management is not in the first place regarded as a category of society, as a 
societal class, or even as a collectivity of professionals, but as combination o f  labour 
process within organisations. " (Teulings, 1986:142) As we noticed earlier, the transfer 
of managerial skill and organisational practices from the matured market economies 
into the post-socialist countries - first o f all into Hungary - are the focus of our 
research. During this investigation, we intend to answer the following interrelated 
questions:
1: What elements o f  managerial skill (and organisation) are required  to successfully 
inn business organisations m the emerging market economies in the post-socialist 
countries? Can we easily distinguish and identify the ‘transferable’ (well-coded 
knowledge in the forms of manuals) and or non-transferable form  o f  management's 
skill?
2: During the transfer o f managerial skills which levels or section o f  management or 
organisation (enterprise, establishment, plant) are the targeted fie ld  of the transfer? 
Can we register changes or modification in priorities o f skill and organisation transfer 
since the 1990’s?
3: How does the ‘amalgamated’ character of the post-socialist economies and societies 
influence the form, and the speed o f  the 'learning p ro cess’ associated with these 
changes? To what degree can the different national social-cultural framework (e.g. 
American versus Hungarian way, Hungarian or Czech way, etc.) explain variations in 
receptivity o f imported managerial methods and concepts? For instance, can we 
identify a distinctive Hungarian, Czech or Polish model o f managerial thinking or 
instead a convergence of managerial skill and organisation?
4: Which institutional legacies facilitate or constrain the managerial and organisational 
transfer to the target country? Can we identify patterns o f behaviours and social 
relations facilitating or constraining the managerial (or organisational) learning process 
(e.g., tradition of cooperation or lack of it in the firm-level labour relations, knowledge 
'hiding’ syndrome in business organisations, etc.)?
75: Do the transfer o f managerial skill and organisation have only technical and fully 
formidable characters or are they permeated by social-cultural and non-transferable 
elements, too?
In our attempt to answer the above-listed questions on the transfer of managerial 
skill and organisation, without exaggeration of the ‘colouring effect’ of history of 
managerial skill development, we intend to pay enough attention to the cumulative 
changes in the organisation of economic activity and the related ‘learning process’ 
during more than four decade of socialist political-economic regime.
The following tables contain the key dimensions o f the learning process related 
to the transfer of managerial skill and methods in the business organisations
Table 1 Key dimensions o f the learning process in the organisations
Dimension o f 
learning process
Explicit (or ‘form al’) Particular ( ‘tacit’)
Individual Collective Individual Collective
Technical-
professional
Social-cultural
The main tools or carriers o f knowledge and practice transfer are the social 
structures, routines, cultures which represent the core compositions of the basic 
institutions in the society as well as in the organisation. The carriers and the ‘comer 
stones’ (or pillars) o f the institutions are illustrated in the next table.
8Table 2 Carriers and Pillars of Institutions
Carriers Pillars
Regulative Normative Cognitive
Culture[+] Rules, laws Values, expectations Categories,
typification
Social structure[++] Governance system, 
power systems
Regimes, authority Structural
isomorphism,
identities
Routmes[+-H-] Protocol, standard 
system,
Conformity, 
performance of duty
Performance 
programs, scripts
Source: Scott, R. (1995: 52)
Notes: [+] Cultural carriers that rely primarily on integrative structures or codified 
patterns o f meanings and rule systems.(Op.cit.p.53.)
[++] Social structural carriers represent forms or types of expectations related 
to networks of social positions. For instance role systems as the 
structures constrain and empower the behaviour o f actors at the same 
time that they are reproduced and transformed by their 
behaviour”(Op.cit.:54)
[+++] Routines as carriers, organisational routines and skill, knowledge of 
members o f firm are the role-stabilisers. Some author (Winter, 1990) 
make distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft1 routines. The ‘hard’ type 
activities are encoded into technologies, the ‘soft’ represents a kind of 
repetitive activities (e.g. assembly line job, data processing job etc.)
Concerning the learning process within the business organisation, the next 
Table sums up its key components which could be analysed by the above presented 
carriers o f the three major institutional forms ( regulative, normative and cognitive).
Analysing the changes in managerial skill and organisation, we intend to use a multi­
dimensional approach of the managerial labour process. In relation with that - 
following the work of Chandler, Touraine and Snellen, Teulings - four functions and 
thereby levels o f management in the modem business organisations could be 
distinguished. (Warhurst, 1996: 25) The Table 3 presents the functions and various 
levels of management.
9Table 3 Functions and levels of managerial labour process
Functions Levels
I. The ownership function (accumulation 
of capital)
Institutional management (creation and 
preservation of legitim ation)
II. The administrative function (allocation 
of investments)
Strategic management (development of 
objectives)
III. Innovative function (product market 
development)
Structuring management (new 
combination of production factors)
IV. The production function (control of 
direct labour process)
Operational management (direction and 
co-ordination of direct labour)
Source: Theuiings, Op.cit.: 154-
In modem large corporations, the above presented four functions of 
management can be identified as separate but interrelated labour process:
a) institutional management represents functions by which the forms of economic 
activity are created and legitimated;
b) strategic management aims to develop enterprise objectives;
c) structuring management engages product market development;
d) operational management which is focusing on the supervision and co-ordination of 
direct labour both in production and service activities.
This multidimensional approach of the managerial labour process helps to 
visualise a number o f legacies o f the socialist-past and the current difficulties of 
corporate management in introducing new concepts and practices. Articulating them in 
such a way, may help the better understanding of transferring managerial skill and 
organisation from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries o f CEE.
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The Chapter I describes the erosion of the soviet-type political and economic 
regime and the gradual changes (reforms) in the organisation of economic activities. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on the emerging market economies following the collapse of 
the socialist planned economy, with special attention to the privatisation process. Due 
to its key role in creating market economies in the CEE countries, Chapter 3 deals with 
the various aspects o f privatisation. Chapters 4 and 5 represent the core part of the 
‘Final Report’ and focus on the process of managerial skill and organisation transfer 
from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries o f CEE. Finally, in the 
‘Conclusion’ we intend to sum up some lessons learned from the experiences in 
reorganising economic activities of the emerging market economies in this region, 
particularly m Hungaiy.
/
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1, Erosion of the „Soviet-Type” model of Organising Economic Activity: the Case 
of the Hungarian Economic Reform Process
1.1. New Economic Reform (1968) and Its Impact: Increasing Diversity in 
Managerial and Organisation Practice in Economic Activities
For the better understanding the present economic restructuring process in the 
post-socialist countries o f the CEE, and especially the variations in efficiency of the 
massive support from the developed economies (mainly from the EU countries) to 
upgrade managerial skill and methods in the transformation economies, it is necessary 
to indicate the similarities and differences in the past development o f these countries. 
In this respect, in the centre of our interest is the legacy of the past having long lasting 
effects both on the structure of managerial labour process and on the pattern of 
behaviour and perceptions of managers.
Following the collapse of the planning-logic based state-socialist political- 
economic system in 1990, the mainstream approaches popular among politicians and 
social scientists - see the details in the introductory chapter - categorically refused to 
follow to any mixed or hybrid model of the post-socialist development. According to 
these views, the precondition of the „s oft-landing” from planned economy into the 
market one, is to cut all institutional ties with the past political-economic system (or as 
Hungarian politicians and journalists often label it ,,with the damned system”). This 
approach is misguided both in relation with the social-economic history of the past and 
also with the institutional diversity o f the „mature market economies.” In the case of 
the developed market economies, this ‘institutional reductionist’ view, did not realise 
the remarkable differences both in macro and local (organisational) level (e.g. Nordic 
versus South European model, Japanese versus American type of economic and social 
development, etc.) These differences leave a strong mark on the combination of 
institutional pillars (e.g. normative, regulative and cognitive) and also on the carriers 
(e.g. social structures, routines and cultures).
It is worth calling attention to the important contribution of the French 
regulation school in identifying the institutional diversity (configuration) in the 
‘matured1 market economies. Boyer summarises well the transformation from one type 
of mixed-economy into another, describing the configuration both of macro and micro 
level regulation o f economic activity: „£n effet, les deux demieres decennies ont 
revele la transition chaotique et plutot myope hors d ’un regime d ’economie mixte que
14
I'approche regulationniste quaiifie de fordiste, beveredgien et keynesien. Ces termes 
characterisent respectivement le compromis capital-travail, le systeme de protection 
sociale decoulant d ’un compromis citoyen - Etat issu de la grande depression et enfin 
t’emploi contracyclique d ’instruments monetaires et fiscaux afin d ’attenuer les 
fluctuation economiques. Le resultat probable sera une nouvelle configuration 
d ’economies mixte. II a ete propose de qualifier ces regimes de toyotiste pour le Japon, 
d ’ uddevaliste pour la Suede, de fordiste nostalgique pour les Etat-iJnis et la France. 
Si un tel diagnostic est correct, il denie toute convergence institutionelle que soit au 
sein du monde occidentale ou pour les pays d ’Europe de i’Est.” (Boyer, 1991. (in) 
Chavance, 1996: 67.)
Despite the still strong tendency of treating the former-socialist political- 
economic system as having ‘uniform’ or ‘homogeneous’ institutions (e.g., the label of 
former ‘soviet-bloc’ countries reflects well this view), the systematic and empirical 
studies discovered significant variation in the development o f both macro- and micro­
level institutions. To understand the nature o f diversity, we have to present the core 
institutional arrangement o f the state-socialist political and economic system.
After the Second World War - more precisely from 1949 in Hungary - a 
combination of economic, political and ideological monopoly was introduced with an 
ambitious aim of the new political elite: to permanently exclude social conflicts 
organised around the distributions o f resources o f society among various social- 
professional groups. Economic monopoly was based first o f all on the almost full 
nationalisation (ironically called ‘socialisation’) o f private and community property in 
the industrial, service and agriculture sectors o f the economy. To illustrate the extent 
of nationalisation, it is necessary to note that, before the Second World War in 
Hungary, only 10 per cent o f the industrial assets were state-owned. The situation in 
the other former-socialist countries was similar. But following the massive 
nationalisation campaign, the state or public ownership became dominant. The next 
Table illustrates the differences in the form of ownership between socialist and 
capitalist countries!
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Table 4 The share o f state for public') ownership in selected countries
Countries (%)
Czecho-Slovakia 97.0
G.D.R. 96.5
USSR 96.0
China 73.6
Hungaiy 65.2
France 16.5
Italy 14.0
F.R.G. 10.7
Spain 4.1
USA 1.3
Source: The share of state(public) ownership m manufacturing sector in different years, (in) Richet. X. 
(1992) ‘Restructuration industrielle et transformation economique en Europe Centrale et Orientate". 
Association Internationale des Economistes de Langite Francaise, Tunis, 21-23 Mai.
The nationalisation of private and community ownership affected not only the 
industrial and service sectors but also agriculture. As a result o f the forced campaigns 
of collectivisation (with the first wave occurring in the first half o f the 1950’s and the 
second wave at the end of 1950’s) and organisational concentration in this sector, the 
majority o f agricultural cooperatives and the state farm ’s activities embraced more than 
one village. The concentration of economic power in the hand of co-operative 
presidents (whose nickname today is ‘green baron’) produced the following social 
impact: the key political actors in the Hungarian villages were neither the local 
government presidents nor the local party secretaries but the presidents of the 
agricultural co-operatives. The economic monopoly was based not only on the 
dominance of the state ownership and on the well-known centralised planning but also 
on the extremely concentrated and centralised organisational structure o f the 
economy. The following Table illustrates well the degree of organisational 
concentration in the planned economies compared to the size o f the capitalist firms 
operating in similar industrial sectors. It is necessary to note that in the former Soviet 
Union, the ‘mega’ firms were dominant. For instance, according to this survey which 
covered 47,000 industrial firms, the average sized firm employed 800 persons. 
(Kablina- Komarovski 1991: 6).
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Table 5 Size Distribution of Manufacturing Firms: Planned Economies Versus 
Western Economies, 1970
Planned economiesfa] Western economies[b]
AH manufacturing Firms
1. Average no of employees per 
firm
197 80
2. Percentage of those employed 
by large firms [c]
6 6 % 32 %
Textile industrv
I. Average number of employees 
per firms
355 81
2. Percentage of those employed 
bv large firms
75 % 1 7 %
The Ferrous Metal lndustrv
1. Average number of employees 
per firm
253 82
2. Percentage of those employed 
by large firms
61 % 2 8 %
The Chemical lndustrv
/. Average number of employees 
per firm
325 104
2. Percentage of those employed 
by large firms
7 9 % 35 %
The Food-Processinc lndustrv
1. Average number of employees 
per firm
103 65
2. Percentage of those employed 
by large firms
3 9 % 1 6 %
Source: Komai, J. (1992) The Socialist System: The Political Economy o f  Communism, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 400.
Note: | a| Sample includes Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland 
| b | Sample includes Austria, Belgium. France. Italy. Japan and Sweden 
|c | Large firms are employing more than 500 people.
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The briefly presented structural components o f the economic monopoly aimed at 
completely replacing the market regulation of resources by the bureaucratic one. The 
economic monopoly was completed by die political monopoly o f Communist Party
and the ideological monopoly of Marxism-Leninism. In a practical sense !
ownership and the bureaucratic redistribution system of central planning, there was no 
more room for conflicts of interest. Therefore - among others - there was no need for 
an autonomous Labour Relations System. Government officials, state firms' managers 
and trade union officials had only the obligation to execute the resolutions of the 
Communist Party, translated into the forms of plans and their indicators.
From the point o f view of development o f managerial skill and organisation, it 
is worth mentioning the one-dimensional system of Labour Relations, in which the 
trade union’s role was largely confined to legitimate the plan-targets; that is to 
mobilise workers to fulfil or overfulfil the plan’s indicators and via this to legitimate 
the new system economic and political performance. The almost complete lack of 
autonomous trade union activity was illustrated by the well-known transmission belt 
function of unions between management and workers. In this one-dimensional Labour 
Relations System (LRS), the only active social actor is the Communist Party, which 
tries to govern the society using the three-pillar structure o f economic, political and 
ideological monopoly. The ideological monopoly aimed to homogenise and unify the 
existing different values and patterns of behaviour in the society. According to the 
dominant Marxist ideology, socialist society and naturally the socialist firms are 
immune to the conflict of interests and powers. In this ideological approach, social 
tensions or deviant behaviour have individual-psychological character and explained 
by low level o f education, underdeveloped consciousness or the influence of 
capitalism, etc. To overcome the lack of motivation to work or to outperform the plan’s 
targets, the political leadership of the country often used the tools of administrative 
punishment mainly in the form of the so called ‘labour discipline campaign’ without 
any remarkable success. (Mako-Gyekiczky, 1987.)
that in the new society based on the homogeneity o f the state (labelled
IS
In this period o f economic development, the enterprise management in die 
dominant large state-firms became par excellence „Homo Administrative”, whose 
production function aimed to control and co-ordinate direct labour. Lacking 
ownership and innovative functions  - using the dimensions of the managerial labour 
process described in the introduction - they very much needed such ‘social- 
organisational skill’ which guaranteed to the firm maximum financial resources via 
fighting with central actors of ‘mega hierarchies’ o f the party and state (bureaucracies) 
in the course of redistribution of resources. The other co-ordination related task of the 
films' management was to keep social peace by tolerating ‘loosened input 
requirements’ of blue collar workers at shop-floor level.^In other words, the managers 
in the state firms and within the conditions of the shortage economy, essentially 
practiced only the ‘production function’ had not enough autonomy to fulfil the 
functions related to ownership, allocation of investment and innovation. The main 
expectations formalised by the representatives of ‘mega-hierarchies’ towards them 
favoured the ‘organisation m an’ or even the ‘civil servant behaviour’ whose key 
ambition is to fulfil the plan’s targets and to control the direct labour. Using the 
managerial labour process approach again, we may assert that the managerial skill and 
methods (organisation) related to the institutional, strategic and structural management 
were underdeveloped compared with the production management and political- 
administrative skills.
In addition, it is necessary to mention that in the archetype socialist firm, the 
available skills and manpower were not necessarily treated as a pool of resources and 
routines which could be used in innovative ways as a condition of better business 
performance. The emphasis of the socialist firms was characterised by the size of 
physical resources (e.g. size of plants, number o f machines, number of employees, the 
size of social welfare facilities, etc.) and at the veiy end by the composition of 
manpower. But the workers1 motivation, and skills o f management were generally 
underestimated among the production factors. The political-ideological rationality 
behind this treatment of managerial labour process was that in the classless society -
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which is free from the basic interest conflicts o f labour and capital, the various social- 
professional groups within die business organisations - like in society as a whole - are 
sharing the same interests: to fulfil the plan targets. In this conflict-free world of die 
state firms, managers were treated as the ‘No. 1 administrator’ o f the State, who had to 
follow the plan’s indicators with the help o f trade unions and were placed under the 
control and initiative o f ‘mega hierarchies’ (Party and government). This view on the 
Labour Relations System, in which the conflicts o f  interests were illegal and 
oppressed, had an extremely shoit ‘life expectancy’. The political challenge of the 
1956’s revolution and the ‘core workers’ significant (informal) bargaining power in the 
labour process together with the alliance of trade union leaders with the firms 
management to fight for a larger share of the available resource questioned the validity 
of the ideological view on the ‘interest and conflict free’ society. The combined effects 
of these factors accelerated both m the relations o f social actors and in the 
development of managerial labour process. The next section focuses on the reform 
attempts within the socialist political and economic regime.
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1.2. Reforms within the Socialist System: An A ttem pt to Combine  
Hierarchies and Markets
A leading architect o f China’s First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) characterised 
the economy within the state-socialist system in the following: S tim ulating  the 
economy is to be done withm the framework of the State-plan. The relationship 
between the two is like a bird in the cage. The bird should be allowed to fly, but within 
the framework of the cage. Otherwise, it will fly away.” (Prybula, 1987:1.) But. within 
the state-socialist type political and economic system the following model could be 
distinguished (Chavance, 1995.):
I: Traditional (Soviet type) model,
2: Systematic adjustment,
3: Radical reforms
Table 6 summarises the key components of these models.
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Table 6 Hierarchies and Markets in Socialist System
Model elements Traditional model Systematic adjusunent Radical reforms
Megahierarchy and 
substantive property rights
m
Petty tutelage of enterprise 
by ministry, usufruct [uses 
fructus| concentrated at 
the centre, strong uses at 
ministry level (3]
Reduction of petty 
tutelage: some 
decentralisation of fructus 
and uses at the enterprise 
level [4]
Abolition of petty 
tutelage; strong 
decentralisation of uses 
and weak decentralisation 
of fructus at the 
enterprise level
Market for consumption 
goods
Unmediated horizontal 
links between buyers and 
sellers
Unmediated horizontal 
links between buyers and 
sellers
Unmediated horizontal 
links between buyers and 
sellers
Market for production 
goods
Horizontal links between 
buyers and sellers 
mediated by vertical links 
in the megaluerarchy
Horizontal links between 
buyers and sellers 
mediated by vertical links 
in the mega hierarchy
Strong reduction of 
vertical mediation in 
horizontal links between 
buyers and sellers
Labour Market Unmediated horizontal 
links between buyers and 
sellers (except for special 
periods)
Unmediated horizontal 
links between buyers and 
sellers
Unmediated horizontal 
links betnveen buyers and 
sellers
Micro hierarchy [2] One-man management One-man management Introduction of soinesort 
of self-management in 
most cases [5]
Source: Chavance, B. (1995), Op.cit. p. 279.
Notes: [1] Mega-hierarchy represents the various forms of hierarchy (e.g. party, state) above the firms.
[2] Micro-hierarchv is functioning within the enterprise but the micro-hierarchy is not simple 
copy o f the mega-hierarchy.
[3] The "usefruct’ (usus fructus) right is concentrated in the hands o f ‘redistributive’ institutions 
(e.g. central planning office). This means that the capital ownership is controlled by the state - 
which is no more than an abstract category - but by the top level control hierarchy practiced by 
the communist party and the state organ.
14] The usus’ right is shared, following the changing bargaining positions of the intermediate 
(regional and local levels) and the enterprise managers.
[5] The introduction o f Enterprise Council (E C.) in the Hungarian firms (1985) terminated the 
formal dependence o f company's management from both the ministries and party organs in the 
field of strategic decision making. (Mako, 1987)
Following the above-presented distinctions on the roles o f market and 
hierarchies in the socialism, the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism - 
almost three decades ago - represents in Hungary (1968) a radical version of economic 
reform. Without going into details - there is rich library on the reform attempts carried 
out in the former socialist countries - these changes increased autonomy of social
actors in organising economic activities (Granick, 1961., Komai, 1980.) For instance, 
companys' managers were not forced to prepare planning, they had more freedom to 
use financial incentives instead of administrative ( ‘coercive’) ones, etc. Liberalisation 
of the labour market represented a break widi die administrative regulation of the 
labour market movement. In addition, the chronic labour shortage within the 
.conditions of the ‘command economy’ assured for the large segment o f the workforce 
a significant individual bargaining position in the forms of exit and entry options . (As 
the well known expression in the labour movement: „A tight labour market is the best 
friend of the employees”.) But due to the lack of genuine collective bargaining 
institution in the socialist firm, the voice option - the other well-known adaptation 
mechanism in the organisation - existed only for employees havmg strong power 
positions in the labour process who influence the ratio between input and output 
favourable for them in the forms of „quota regulation” (Hethy-Mako, 1989.) The 
increased autonomy for the social actors (both for managers and trade union leaders) 
modified their social and economic relations within the firm. For instance, the 
increased freedom of managers in the field of production was counterbalanced for 
instance by the right of veto o f trade union m relation to the managerial decisions.
To illustrate the nature of firm-level changes in the Hungarian economy, it is 
worthwhile calling attention to some changing elements o f the managerial labour 
process. These changes, first of all, aimed to develop one of the limited resources in 
the state owned firms: the quality of management and organisation. In relation to
socialist firms, management scientists usually stress the following characteristics o f the 
socialist-type economic system: a), excess physical resources, b). limited financial 
resources, c). limited managerial resources. (Peng - Heath, 1996: 501.)
During the 1960’s and 1970’s, Hungarian firms were the locations o f wide- 
ranging initiatives in the field of work-organisation and managerial methods. The 
relevant initiatives partly came from the representatives of the mega-hierarchy and 
pally  from the enterprise management. Empirical research conducted at the firm-level 
discovered that several organisational and managerial innovations had been introduced
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into the labour process. Among others thing, it is worth mentioning the various 
initiatives of the firm management to encourage the group-centred division of tasks 
instead of an individualistic emphasis, the introduction of systems of job evaluation 
and job-classification, and implementing wider possibilities to improve employees 
participation in managerial decision making, etc. (Bossanyi-Nyikos, 1987., Hethy, 
,1983.)
Often independently from the centrally backed initiatives but under the pressub 
of the chronic labour shortage and the frequent ‘bottle-necks’ in the production 
process, shop-floor managers tolerated and in several cases even supported the 
idividual or collective initiative of workers to improve job satisfaction and worl 
j rertgrmance. fMako. 1980 ^  These^chanpe^H^wtLated more than two and fratTcleca^es 
ago, represent a 'positive legacy’ of the cumulative development in sia.il stracture and 
work organisation and have accelerated the present restructuring process. For instance, 
AUDI, the well-know German car manufacturer has recently started to manufacture its 
newest engine in Gyor, located near to the Austrian border. From 1998, AUDI will use 
the engines manufactured in Hungary exclusively for its gasoline powered cars. 
According to the German president, the technical training of workers and managers is 
excellent, mainly because most of them were employed at the RABA Truck Company 
located in the same city. According to the President, German workers cannot believe 
that the Hungarians now are manufacturing high tech engines, which are the ‘heart’ of 
the AUDI A4, the new VW Passat and Skoda Octavia. (Nota bene: The RABA Truck 
Company was among the first in CEE countries to manufacture world-quality engines 
based on the licence bought from the German MAN firm in early 1970’s. This 
"flagship’ Hungarian company’s president - who had the nickname of ‘Red-baron’ due 
to his membership in the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist W orker’s Party 
- not only introduced the state of art manufacturing technology and work organisation 
but also invested heavily into R & D activities.)
1Apart from such core sectors o f the economy as car manufacturing, even in 
several leading large clothing companies, anticipative managers were playing initiative 
roles in introducing ‘world-class1 managerial techniques (e.g., QAS systems) and 
Computer Aided Design and Cutting Systems, etc., during the I970’s. These 
managerial initiatives were often criticised by workers, trade unions and paity officials 
as „capitalist techniques” to intensify work, and such resistance in several cases 
slowed down the speed of changes. These movements o f upgrading managerial 
organisation, skill and production technology were stimulated or forced by the rapidly
easing production co-operation between the Hungarian and Western firms, veiy/  /
en m the form of Job-processing”. The continuous development o f theses firms has 
played a significant role in keeping their com petitive edge” in the relevant sector, 
during 1990’s, too.
V  ...
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1.3. M icro-Flexibility and Macro-Rigidity: Lessons from the Experiences  
with „Inside Contracting Groups” (V G M K ’S) (Period o f 1980’s)
After this sketchy outline of changes induced by different motivations and 
pressures, we shall try to present the developments o f the 1980’s, that is, the last 
decade before the collapse o f the socialist political and economic regime. Among the 
various initiatives o f the economic policy makers, it is necessary to mention the so- 
called ‘policy package’ to develop small undertakings from the early 1980’s. The aim 
of this central economic policy initiative was to overcome the macro-rigidity o f the 
socialist economic system. To illustrate the extremely high level o f rigidity o f the 
macro-economic decision making in Hungary and other CEE countries, we intend to 
use some empirical evidences. The best indicator to illustrate the extremely rigid 
character of this economic system is the „wait-and-see” syndrome. As a Hungarian 
economist specialised in studying economic trends noticed: „After 1973, contrary to 
the reaction of the world economy itself, a clear-cut regional boom began to unfold in 
the state socialist countries. White the world economy was already suffering from  the
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price shocks and the recession that followed, and wols attempting to counteract the 
effect by structural rearrangement, the East European region continued along its 
previous growth path as i f  nothing had happened. Along with unconditioned reflex the 
non-action was actually reinforced by a certain degree o f  ideological support. " 
(Bekker, 1995: 101.) This extremely long time-lag in the macro-level decision making 
is well .illustrated by the policy response to the well-known oil price rises, which 
pressed or forced the developed market economies into the direction of economic
restructuring. See Figure 1.
East European Regional Boom after 1973
C'O
Source: Bekker, Zsuzsa (1995) "On Janossv's Trendline".. Acta Oeconomica. 
no. 47. p. 103.
Even in the case o f the Hungarian economy which adopted the most radical 
reforms within the socialist system, central decision makers initiated the necessary 
changes only after a 6-7 year delay. But during this delayed reaction, the 
reorganisation of economic activity did not aim to change the leading policy-making 
role of the Communist Party and the monopoly of state-ownership. In this perspective, 
one can see toleration o f the development o f the 'hybrid’ economy. This means - 
among other things - the emergence of the so-called second economy (this term refers
all types of economic activities organised outside the state controlled and planned 
economy) which questioned - besides its economic and social significance - die 
efficiency of the bureaucratic regulation of economic activities. The growing economic 
role of the second economy became visible from the mid-1970’s. At die end of this 
decade, one third o f the household income was generated from this sector. These 
activities were extremely important in the agriculture, housing construction and the 
service sectors. (Gabor - Horvath - Lae - Murard, 1990.) The attractive performance of 
the second economy created initiatives to diversify the management and organisation 
methods within the large state enterprise operating in the firs t economy, too.
The greatest national and international interests and disputes in relation to 
impacts on existing managerial practice and skill use was focused on the activities of 
the Inside Contracting Groups (hereinafter referred to as VGMKs, the Hungarian 
acronym) implemented from 1982. (Stark, 1985,, 1986., Mako-Simonyi, 1992., 
Grabher, 1995.) It was for the first time in the histoiy after the Second World War in 
the Hungarian industrial practice that social scientists could be witness to an 
organisational innovation, in which nearly 200,000 people - mainly blue collar 
workers - participated, which was almost unanimously supported by industrial society. 
The VGMKs operated after regular working time and fully replaced the company’s 
need for overtime work. Their members were selected on a voluntary basis and these 
groups of workers (or other social-professional categories) were bargaining with the 
management on the price of work-contract without the interference o f the Trade 
Union.
The pattern o f  human resource use and co-operation were different in 
comparison with the work-organisation o f  full-tim e (or regular) job. To build, operate 
and explore a set o f relations, different from the clearly divided and defined 
hierarchical organisational structure o f full-time employment based on maximum 
specialisation. The work performed in the VGMKs required considerable efforts and 
multi-skill use from their members. But in turn, their members learned significant
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‘organisational skills’, a holistic view not only of their work organisation but o f the 
operation of the plant, too.
The simultaneous participation in the over-specialised, individualised job- 
structure of the full-time employment and ‘job-em p^(em ent’ in VGMKs after regular 
working time enables the members o f these autonomous working groups to compare, 
and critically evaluate this ‘double-pattern’ of work-organisation. During these 
contrasting working experiences, working group members were able to develop richer 
technical-professional and social-organisational skills or knowledge. Among the 
members of VGMKs, it was widely recognised that the clear boundaries between 
certain sectors o f production (e.g., manufacturing, maintenance, programming, internal 
material transport and handling, quality control, etc.) had only administrative-social 
relevance and did not serve flexibility (or smooth operation) in the production. The 
members o f  these autonomous working groups, organised their activities within 
organisational networks, integrating both horizontal and vertical relations. This 
pattern of organising economic activity via amorphous relationships of mutual 
dependence had a clear contrast in comparison with the dominant formal-hierarchical 
management system based on individualised and segmented use o f skill and 
manpower.
The development o f VGMKs gave the chance for more than 10 per cent of the 
industrial work-force to participate in a working-system based on ‘high-involvement’ 
and to develop and use extensive networks within and outside the socialist firms. The 
network-type relations can be distinguished from both hierarchical and market type 
ones, because transactions between economic actors are based neither on the logic of 
hierarchy (administrative order) nor on discrete market exchange. In spite o f the fact 
that the top management of the socialist firms were unable or more precisely 
unmotivated to integrate the lessons from VGMKs activities into its methods and 
organisation, the one decade history of this innovative work-organisations in the 
Hungarian firms questioned the efficiency of the bureaucratic regulation and 
management structure and demonstrated clearly the advantages of network-based
regulation within the business organisations. Furtherm ore, the development of the 
‘social-organisational’ skills along with ‘technical-professional’ ones equipped the 
VGMK's members with the necessary skill and networking knowledge to create their 
own business following the collapse of the socialist political-economic system. (Kuczi- 
Mako, 1996.)
The outcomes of the „dual-pattem” of work-organisation became important new 
elements o f the ‘organisation routines’ in combination with the „physical” and „human 
resources” in the development of post-socialist firms. As the representatives o f the 
evolutionary approach noticed the importance of ‘organisational routines’ in the 
growth of the firm: „The efficiency of a firm is a function of its routines, which are the 
product of its cumulative organisational history. Diffused throughout the organisation, 
these routines are not embodied in any individual. As such, organisational routines 
take on a tacit nature, thus making articulation of such routines difficult.” (Peng-Heath, 
1996: 496.)
The experiences o f VGMKs became an integrated part of the development of 
organisation and management in Hungary. We intend to stress again, that the 
simultaneous functioning of these autonomous working groups within the over- 
centralised and specialised skill and manpower use in the socialist firms, had 
diversified (or modernised) the methods of the ‘operational management’ in 
comparison with the other components o f the managerial labour process (e.g., 
institutional, strategic and structural management). The below-listed lessons o f the 
VGMKs show well their significant roles in changing normative, regulative and even 
cognitive components o f socialist firms as social institutions. Through these complex 
changes, the learning capacity and adaptability of the former socialist firms improved, 
as well.
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First, co-operation is generated not only by hierarchical (bureaucratic) 
mechanism, but also by the network-type social relations which open channels for 
action on the basis o f reciprocity principle (or regulation). This means that even within
the socialist firms where hierarchical order was the dominant mechanism in governing 
economic activities, from the beginning of 1980’s another governance mechanism, 
network, was completed.
Second, the initiatives for change do not come only from the representatives of 
the mega-hierarchy (e.g., Party and government organs) or micro-hierarchy (e.g., top 
management of the firm). Different groups of rank-and-file employees have notable 
diough unequal degree o f  autonomy, diat is perceivable only in the long term, in 
moulding and influencing social relations both inside and outside the firm.
Third, the flexibility of operations in VGMKs amounts to a most obvious 
criticism of the performance and quality o f the firm ’s management, especially 
questioning the necessity o f the heavy and over-centralised organisation stru c tu re  of 
management. With their records of performance, these autonomous groups undermined 
the raison d ’etre o f  certain functions and structures o f  management (e.g., the presence 
of the overpopulated groups of middle managers, unnecessarily great numbers o f levels 
of management, separation and specialisation of the quality control function, etc.) But 
on the other hand, they also demonstrated the important role o f supervisors in the 
shop-floor level bargaining process, whose roles were generally underestimated and 
downgraded.
Fourth, the experience of the VGMKs, with regard to the wage-incentives, has 
impelled not only enterprise management, but also government regulations concerned 
with wage and income to adopt more innovative tools.
Finally, the practice of bargaining between representatives o f VGMKs and 
management deregulated the trade union control on the working conditions and wages. 
This deregulation has greatly contributed to the decline o f trade union influence and 
increased the income inequalities between members o f VGMKs and non-members; the 
process o f labour market segmentation within the socialist firms accelerated.
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The remarkable performance of VGMKs not only challenged the existing 
structures and methods of management, but also enlarged the spaces for the social 
learning process and increased the possibilities to build-up trust relations at the work­
places. The new model o f direct interest representation and co-ordination emerged 
from the world of hidden and informal bargaining and left room for large segments of 
the workforce to leam how to shape the patterns of social relations prevailing in the 
labour process. In other words, the presence of VGMKs can be interpreted as a partial 
decentralisation of usufruct rights which were concentrated in the traditional Soviet 
type system exclusively in the hands of ‘re-distributors’ and strong decentralisation of 
us us rights o f ownership for the social actors of the firm (e.g., management and 
VGMKs members) and regional or other local actors (e.g., Party officials, trade union 
leaders) had no more formal right to intervene. The implementation of the institution 
of the Enterprise Council in the middle o f 1980’s further strengthened the position of 
enterprise management and increased the autonomy of the managerial labour process. 
For the first time in the history of the socialist-type economy, the ‘operative’ 
(production) function o f management was enlarged with some ‘institutional’ 
(ownership) and ‘strategic’ management ones.
1.4. Increasing Autonomy of Management: the C ase o f  the Enterprise  
Councils (1985-1990)
The other innovation in the managerial labour process (and organisation) in this 
period, the Enterprise Councils (EC) were established as the highest collective body of 
the management o f the state owned (public) firms. Half o f their members were 
delegated from among the ranks of management, the other half were elected directly 
from rank-and-file employees, blue collar workers. All the strategic decisions o f the 
. firm (e.g., important investments, mergers, significant lay-offs, etc.) should have been
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formally considered by these councils that received even the right o f electing the 
directors o f the firms. In Hungary, this solution of direct participation of employees in 
the EC aimed to exercise control over the emerging technocrats o f the still state-owned 
firms. The Communist Party and trade union officials, invited to the meetings of the 
EC for first time in the history of state socialism had no right to vote on the issues 
discussed.
In spite of the original wish of the initiators o f this institution, the EC did not 
become the body of ‘self-management’ in the Hungarian firms. The practice of these 
ECs in the mid 1980’s was rather contradictory. For instance, their directly elected 
members were not prepared enough to follow and influence strategic decisions of the 
firms concerning investments, technical development, finance and organisational 
restructuring. According to the evidence of surveys, the rank-and-file employees even 
restrained themselves from being elected, so mostly lower level managers and foremen 
were delegated by them. Anyway, for those who participated in these councils, higher 
and lower level managers o f the enterprise learned important experiences in collective 
decision making and how to get insight on the problems of the shop-floor community 
via delegates o f rank-and-file employees. Briefly, the half decade functioning of the 
ECs increased the autonomy of management on the following fields of managerial 
labour process: institutional, structural and strategic management.
The above-listed changes carried out within the framework of macro-economic 
control of the Communist Party and the unchanged nature o f the ownership structure, 
were not sufficient to create genuinly independent social actors at firm level. Plus, it is 
necessary to note that the resources available for the firms - in the majority of cases - 
did not depend on the economic performance of the individual firms, but from the re­
distribution of the centralised resources among the strongest political-economic 
(interest) coalitions, which often cover their true ambitions in well-designed 
‘ideological-mask’ (Belley-Rozgonyi, 1996.)
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The majority o f firms was under-financed, and in spite o f die earlier described 
organisational and managerial innovation, the quality o f managerial resources was very 
unequally developed. These shortcomings in the shortage economy forced managers 
to run their business as a just-in-case system to hoard physical resources, which is 
in contrast to the just-in-time system pioneered by Japanese. As a result, excess 
physical resources can often be found” in the socialist firms (Peng-Heath, 1996:508). 
The inefficiency symptoms in manufacturing process in the former socialist countries 
are well illustrated by the so-called Kornai ratios, which is die indicator of input 
inventories versus output inventories: the higher ratio signals a strong resource 
hoarding approach adopted by the socialist management in contrast with the opposite 
pattern o f managerial behaviour m the market economies. Table 7 shows the 
systematic differences between the stronger safety net ambition of socialist managers 
and the downsizing attitude of the managers in the capitalist firms.
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Table 7 The Komai ratios o f Input versus Output Stocks: International 
Comparison
Manufacturing enterprise 1981 - 1985
Planned Economies
Bulgaria 5.07
China -
Czechoslovakia 3.07
Hungary 6.10
Poland 4.49
Soviet Union 3.16
Market economies
Canada 0.92
Japan 1.09
Sweden 0.89
United Kingdom 1.02
United States 1.02
West Germany 0.71
Source: Komai, J. (1992) The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, p. 250.,(in) Peng-Heath (1996) Op.cit. p. 508.
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In spite o f the growing liberalisation of the Hungarian economy, the positive 
changes generated at the firm-level organisation of economic activities (e.g., the New 
Economic Mechanism combining planning with some elements of the market 
economy) were not sufficient to produce favourable macro-economic performance. In 
other words, the micro-flexibility developed by the organisational (institutional) 
innovations (e.g., the second economy, VGMKs, ECs) were unable to counterbalance 
such negative symptoms of the macro-rigidity of the planned economies:
■ the extremely .slow reaction time in the system of macro-economic decision making 
system,
*  the economic shortage created regular bottle necks in the production process and the 
tendency of using enormous size of buffer stocks;
■ the permanent resource hoarding instead of resource saving  behaviour combined 
with the ‘wait and see’ attitudes o f the socialist mangers generated by the chronic 
shortage of resources.
The innovations in the organisations o f economic activities at micro (enterprise) 
level and the creation of the so-called second economy were not enough to dynamise 
the macro-economic performance of the Hungarian economy which had to finance 
huge foreign indebtedness. The next section (2) deals with the collapse o f the socialist 
political and economic regime and the institution building of the emerging market 
economy.
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2. Collapse of the State Socialist Political-Economic Regime and the 
Emerging M arket Economies in CEE Countries
2.1. Converging and Diverging Tendencies of Institution Building in the Post- 
Socialist Countries: the Case of Privatisation
Illustrating the similarities and differences of institution building in the post­
socialist countries, we intend to concentrate primarily on the developments in the four 
‘Visegrad-countries’. But even among these four countries which are following a 
relatively similar pattern o f transformation, we may identify different trajectories of 
development. (Hungary, among them, did not ‘properly’ follow the principle o f the 
traditional (Soviet-type) socialist planned economy. This deviance from both the 
‘traditional model’ and the ‘systematic adjustment’ in the form of ‘radical reform’ has 
a strong impact on the current path of development, too. For instance, in relation to 
privatisation, a German social scientist noted that the Hungarian „ ... privatisation 
approach - as a fust and fundamental difference to East Germany is not based on a 
‘proper’ dichotomous conception of property rights, that is o f private versus public 
control. Hence it might appear more appropriate to conceptualise the Hungarian 
approach as property transformation rather than privatisation in the strict sense. 
Moreover ... the Hungarian history of transforming state property did not just start in 
1989 but can be traced back to three main lines o f change in the ownership 
structure.’’(Grabher, 1995: 40.) In this report, we have described already the process of 
‘hybridisation’ of state economy by the creation o f a 'second econom y’ and the 
introduction of an economic program characterized by small steps. One of these small 
undertakings was presented in describing the functioning of VGMKs in the large state 
firms. The other elements of proto-pnvatisation were the legal possibility to create 
joint-ventures, comprising state-owned firms and foreign capital (e.g. Siemens AG, the 
well-known German electric and electronic firm created the first joint-venture at the 
beginning of 1970’s in Hungary.) It is also necessary to mention the movement of 
‘autonomy’ or ‘independence' o f  individual plants within the large state corporations. 
(Neuman, 1993.) The focus of this chapter will be the company level transformation
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process and the illustrating cases based on empirical research and also on available 
statistics.
The current analyses of the privatisation process in the CEE countries often do 
not take into consideration the differences in the ‘stalling conditions’. This explains 
the popularity o f the convergence approach concerning the future societal model in the 
post-socialist countries. The experiences o f the last half decade of development are 
showing a coexistence of both the tendency of convergence and divergence in the 
development trajectories in these countries. Still it would be very risky and premature 
to typify the model o f market economy emerging in this CEE region. Instead, we 
intend to analyse the various kinds of national-historical and institutional development 
in comparative perspective and to adopt the so-called ‘subjective relativism’ approach. 
According to this approach, the various institutional elements regulating the attitudes 
and behaviours o f social actors (e.g., regulative, normative and cognitive) are quite 
stable (or rigid) in the short run.
In this section, we try to illustrate both converging and diverging characteristics 
of privatisation, an institution which is playing a core role in transferring managerial 
skill and organisation from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries o f CEE. In 
identifying the characteristics of the present development, it is worth distinguishing the 
following two groups of factors: (The similarity and dissimilarity o f legal and
regulatory environments o f the Visegrad-countries is summarised in the Appendix 1.)
a). Factors of convergence:
■ increasing corporate autonomy by privatisation,
■ globalisation of economic activities,
■ key role o f Foreign Direct Investment in the modernisation process of the 
countries concerned.
b). Factors o f divergence:
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■ Differences and uneven development in the forms of privatisation,
■ Industrial Relations System: from patterns o f co-operation to confrontation,
■ Variety inform s of FDI: ‘brownfield’ versus ‘greenfield’ investments.
Among the actors o f convergence and divergence, we intend to deal with the 
phenomena o f privatisation. Following the collapse o f the socialist political-economic 
regime, numerous simplistic and over-optimistic views dominated the debate on 
privatisation. For instance, the simplistic expectation of the „Terminator” role of 
privatisation is well summarised in the next statement: „Some advocated systematic 
privatisation believing that such simple ownership are sufficient to bring about a 
radical break with past patterns of economic and political behaviour. Formerly 
wasteful and unresponsive public sector managers will become eager searcher for 
efficiency and panderers to consumer desires. Formerly disinteresed, alienated and 
irresponsible citizens will discover a new stake in preserving their community and the 
economic institutions that sustain them..." (Feigenbaum-Henig, 1993, ‘Privatisation 
and Democracy’, (in) Ellingstad, 1996: 41.)
H alf a decade later, the ‘political divide’ in the post-socialist countries of CEE, 
private ownership became a common dominator both in the share o f employment and 
GDP in the ‘Visegrad-countries’. See Table 8.
Table 8 Private Sector Growth in the ‘Visegrad Countries’
Countries Private sector share in 
Employment
Private sector share in GDP
1989 1994 1989 1994
Czech Republic 16% 65 % 0 -  10% 56%
Hungaiy 20% 65 % 2 0 % 55-56 %
Poland 47% 61 % 25-28 % 58 %
Slovak Republic < 10% 55 % 10% 5 8 %
Sourcc: Borish, M.S. - Noel, M. (1996) 'Private Sector Development During Transition’
(The Visegrad Countries), Washington; World Hank Discussion Papers, No.3 18. p, 87
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The results of the massive privatisation programs introduced in the CEE region 
over the past half decade are well illustrated in Table 8. In spite of the similarities in 
outcomes of privatisation m terms of employment and in share o f GDP, there are 
noticeable differences in the forms or patterns of privatisation. But the aggregate 
statistics at national level cannot reflect the diversity o f ownership-patterns.
The more detailed analysis o f pnvatisation process needs sectoral, firm-level 
empirical studies. In spring 1996, on the mitiative o f the Hokkaido University Slavic 
Research Centre (Sapporo), the Hungarian National Research Team carried out a 
survey together with the other ‘Visegrad-countries’ in the machine industry. (The 
Hokkaido Project, 1996, see the Project Description in the Appendix 2.) The machine 
industry m general - and the machine tool industry especially - is often treated in the 
literature as a thermometer for the larger national economy. This means that the 
economic recession hits first this sector and the economic recovery also appeal's here 
first. Looking at the profile o f firms participating in the survey, we may conclude that 
the outcomes of the extensive privatisation schemes pursued in the CEE region over 
the past six years are evident in the statistics. For Hungary, only 14.3 per cent of firms 
sampled in the machine industrial sector are classified as a state-owned jom t stock 
company (i.e., the stocks are majority-owned by a state holding company), with no 
firms being classified as traditional state enterprises (See Table 9).
A rather small percentage - 2.9 per cent in the Hungarian case - o f firms are 
newly created ‘greenfield’ sites (Note: ‘greenfield site, separate from existing 
developments, are newly developed for the first time as opposite to ‘brownfield sites’ 
which have been previously developed to some extent, Schwarz, 1996: 458 and 129.) 
Greenfield sites, which have attracted increasing attention as the CEE countries 
become increasingly attractive locations for exporting into the EU, are likely 
underrepresented in the survey precisely because they are so new. (Researchers 
sometimes lack not only the contacts - already built up at older firms - but also have
difficulties to receive permission and to get the ‘foot in the door’ in order to conduct 
appropriate interviews. ) As the vast majority o f  firm s sampled have nearly all gone 
from  state ownership to various form s o f  private ownership in the last years, 
concurrent with major changes in markets and products, the Hokkaido survey can be 
seen as one o f  the firs t measures o f  Central European corporate anatomy following  
stages o f  intense stress and social prices in these transformation economies. See the 
Table 9 on the great variety of ownership types in the ‘Visegrad-countries’.
Table 9 Types and legal forms of enterprise ownership
Types of ownership Poland Czech
Republic
Slovakia Hungary
1. State enterprise 26.7 % 3.3 % 4.2 % 0.0 %
2. Former state 
enterprise
a. State-owned 
joint stock co.
36.7 % 3.3 % 12.5 % 14.3 %
b. Privatized joint 
stock co.
30.0 % 70.0 % 58.3 % 22.9 %
c.Limited liability
CO.
6.7 % 3.3 % 0.0 % 20.0 %
3. New private 
enterprise
a.Joint stock co. 0.0 % 3.3 % 4.2 % 2.9 %
b. Limited liability
CO.
0.0 % 3.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
4. Joint venture 0.0 % 3.3 % 8.3 % 20.0 %
5. Other 0.0 % 10.0 % 8.3 % 20.0 %
No answer 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.2 % 0.0
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996.
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As stated earlier, the machine industry in the CEE region generally experienced 
economic crisis before most of other sectors of economy, but also emerges from the 
depth sooner than odier industries. Most of the firms surveyed have already passed 
through the most critical years of the transformation. Evaluating the results of the 
Hungarian privatisation process in comparison with other CEE countries, we share the 
following opinion: the transformation of ownership relations was slower in
Hungary than in other countries where mass-privatisation was carried out in the form 
of free-distribution of the ‘fragmented’ ownership rights. In Hungaiy, already existing 
entrepreneurs became owners who could exercise real control on management and 
could enforce profit motivation. This way of privatisation played significant role in 
carrying out deep restructuring (re-organisation) in the large numbers o f firm s” 
(Komai, 1996: 609.) Notable is the relative lack of declining or failing firms in the 
Hungarian case, a larger share o f which would likely have been seen had the survey 
been carried out only two years earlier. The vast majority of the firms have survived 
the ngors of privatisation and subsequent restructuring, with positive results beginning 
to reveal themselves.
The data presented in Table 9, illustrates not only the dominance of private 
ownership, but also the great variety of ownership patterns in the post-socialist 
countries o f CEE. In Poland, for instance, the still state owned firms represent more 
than one quarter o f the firms surveyed. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the 
‘privatised joint-stock co.’ of the former state enterprises represents the largest 
segment of the firms investigated, but they have the largest share o f the newly created 
private enterprises, too. Hungary has the more diversified ownership structure, with 
two thirds o f the firms representing various privatised forms of former state-ownership 
(e.g., state-owned joint-stock co., privatised joint-stock co., limited liability co.) and 
one fifth o f them belongs to the category of joint-venture firms.
Comparing the aggregate statistics of the share o f privatisation on employment 
and GDP in the countries participating in the international suivey, we may identify 
some degree of convergence: the share of private sector both in employment and in
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GDP vanes between 55 and 61 per cent. The more structured evaluation of 
privatisation in such a key sector o f national economy as the machine industry reveals 
significant signs of divergence in the forms of privatisation: on the one extreme of the 
‘ownership variety scale located Poland where the state and privatised state ownership 
is dominant, with the other extreme point o f the case represented by Hungary’s 
extremely rich ownership forms (e.g., among them the share o f joint-ventures several 
times higher compared with the other countries), and the middle position is occupied 
by the Czech and Slovak Republics. The great variety in the forms of private 
ownership opens also a variety o f options (or trajectories) for the transfer of 
managerial skill and organisation. For instance, in the case o f firms remaining m state 
ownership, the challenge for management to restructure economic activity is weaker 
than in the joint-ventured firms. But to answer to the challenge created by the 
nansformation crisis related problems, it is necessary to pay attention outside the 
visible characteristics o f privatisation to the less visible ‘human-organisational1 side of 
transformation process. These factors are embedded in the social-organisational 
„fabric” o f the company’s organisation and influenced by the environment of the 
business organisation.
After presenting the similarities and differences in the ownership changes in the 
‘Visegrad-countries’, the next chapter focuses on the other elements of the 
transformation process.
A ppendix  I
1. The Hokkaido survey was conducted in Spring, 1996 in the four Visegrad countries 
at the manufacturing companies in the machine industry employing at least 500 
employees. The sample includes 35 firms in Hungary, 30 firms in the Czech Republic 
and Poland, and 24 firms in Slovakia. In order to create a representative sample, the 
companies were located in at least three or four different regions in each country. 
Guided, extensive interviews were conducted by professional researchers attached with 
each country team with top managers o f the companies (usually the general director) 
regarding issues of corporate governance and communication channels, current 
business performance and the main factors affectmg it, industrial relations, and the 
influence distribution in decision making. The focus o f analysis will be centred on 
current levels o f company performance, strategies being pursued by firms in the region 
to survive and develop, and implications for current and future patterns of social 
relations in the firms.
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A p p e n d ix  2
Overview of Visegrad Countries’ Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Environment
Business
retzistration
Commercial
Code
Civil Code Bankruntcv
Liquidation
Regulation Taxation Foreiiin
investment
Czech
Republic
Need
simultaneous
processing,
fewer
locations:
improvement
since 1990
Conflict of
interests;
limited
bankruptcy,
liquidation,
tax rules limit
debt write-off
Collateral 
limited by 
land registry, 
title, secured 
credit limited; 
tenancy 
restrictive
Focus on 
liquidation, 
not corporate 
restructuring; 
weak dispute 
resolution, 
court capacity
Open trade 
and
investment:
demonopoliz
and
privatisation
of
infrastructure 
and utilities
High tax rates 
lead to 
avoidance; 
only country 
without 
holidays
Hungary Registration 
easy; large 
informal 
sector due to 
high taxes, 
not
registration
procedure
Extensive use 
of bankruptcy 
+ liquidation; 
small-scale 
transactions 
follow Civil 
Code
Enforces 
contracts, 
basis for 
property 
rights; 
problems; 
tenancy, land 
registries
Strong
capacity;
recent
amendments
should
increase
effectiveness
Open trade 
and
investment;
demonopoliz’
and
privatising of 
infrastructure 
and utilities
Rates high, 
especially 
social 
insurance
Successful
despite
gradualist
approach to
privatisation;
open
environment
Poland Taxes + Fee 
requirements 
provide 
perverse 
incentives to 
keep firms 
under­
capitalised
Collateral 
legislation 
needs central 
registry for 
liens, more 
creditor 
recourse, 
market-based 
liquidation
Restrictive 
tenancy, 
multiple 
titles, costly 
land
registration, 
lack of bank 
recourse 
lowers credit
Out-of-court
common;
collateral
protection,
judicial
infrastructure
limit court
use
Open trade
regime;
obstacles to
privatisation,
demonopolisa
-tiou
Rates high; 
evasion 
common: 
policy favours 
investment tn 
GoP paper vs. 
Enterpr's; 
holidays 
ineffective
Barriers,
political
turnover,
privat.;
holidays
ineffective;
foreign
investment
small-scale
Slovak
Republic
Needed: 
simpler, 
faster process, 
lower fees, 
more
information,
etc.
Unclear Code 
weak court 
capacity, lack 
of creditor 
recourse all 
lead to poor 
contract 
enforcement
Restrictive 
tenancy, weak 
title and bank 
recourse 
undermine 
property 
rights; need 
new Coll. Law
Limited
capacity,;
deficient
information;
binding
arbitration,
simplified
procedures
Open trade;
obstacles to
investment,
privatisation,
demonopolisa
-tion
High rates;
holidays,
guarantees,
exemptions,
other
incentives not 
successful
Poor, 
unreliable 
information, 
delays, 
political 
turnover, 
privatisation 
j reversals etc
Source: Borish, S. Michael-Noel, Michael (1996) 'Private Sector Development During Transition' 
(The Visegrad Countries), World Bank Discussion Papers. No. 318. P. 2.
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3. Overestim ating the Role of Privatisation in Conversion from the Planned 
to M arket Economy in the Countries of CEE
3.1. Antecedents of Privatisation: Restructuring the Hungarian Enterprise 
M anagem ent System  in the 1980’s
The soviet-type model of the enterprise management system (or company's 
organisational smicture) adopted in all former socialist countries is essentially based 
on the early stage of the Western business organisation and management. For instance, 
even in the 1970’s, the so-called ‘centralised functional management’ was regarded as 
the best organisational structure in Hungary. The dominant management organisation 
was the functional-unitary bureaucratic form  o f  organisation, which served at 
realising the traditional and vertical expansion strategies according to Chandler. 
(Chandler, 1962.) As the authors reviewing the evolution in forms of business 
organisation in Hungary recently have noticed „ ... the Hungarian development of 
organisational forms between 1945 and 1980 has achieved the first stage o f the US and 
Western European companies which was completed by the fifties and sixties.” (Dobak- 
Tari, 1996:10.)
The Figure 2 illustrates the exclusive mode of the ‘centralised-functional7 organisation 
in Hungary.
n
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J
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Figure 2 The Organisational Chart of a Typical, Linear-Functional organisation in
the large enterprise in machine industry
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The first wave of the re-organisation of large state-firms represented the 
replacement of the ‘linear-functional unitary bureaucratic’ form of organisational 
structure by ‘matrix organisation' and product-managemenl system. The pioneer 
initiative was launched by a flagship socialist firm, the TAURUS Rubber Works at the 
end of 1970. Its organisational structure is illustrated by Figure 3. (It is worth 
mentioning fhat this company was purchased by the French multinational. Michelin 
Tyre in October, 1996. However, the new owner insisted on keeping and using the 
'brand name of TAURUS’, which is well introduced and known in the tyre market of 
the CEE countries and of the countries of Commonwealth of the Independent States.
Figure 3 The Direction of Functional Based Matrix Orsianisaiton in the Eai lv
1980’s
l op M iiiingcmciti
S i;ifT
Source: Dobak-Tari (1996) Op.cit. p. 14.
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In most of the cases, product managers had only co-ordinated the responsibility, 
however, the decisional power was still in the hands of functional managers. Due to 
the lack of balance in power between functional and product managers, die latent 
conflict became invisible; „The different interests could not confront each other 
openly. Consequently, effective compromises or properly reconciled decisions for 
evolving the market sensibility and regrouping resources rapidly and flexibly could 
not be made, either ... The excessive written regulation remained in force, and so for 
functional bodies, they jealously watched over their resources, questioning from time 
to time product management system as whole.” (Dobak-Tari, 1996:14-15).
The final steps in modernising the organisation of large state firms - in the 
advent of the collapse o f the socialist political-economic regime - were earned out in 
the late 1980’s. Both Western and Hungarian ‘organisation designers’ advocated the 
divisionalisation o f business organisations (partly promoted by the World Bank to 
introduce more flexible forms of organisations to increase competitiveness of the 
Hungarian firms). This movement was welcomed by the so-called ‘independence 
movement’ of the individual plants operating within large state companies. (Neuman, 
1993.) As a result o f the popularity and diffusion of the divisional organisational 
structure, in several large state enterprises the divisional managers cost-sensitivity (i.e., 
‘thinking in money’) have improved considerably; „ ... the flexibility and the 
entrepreneunal spirit o f internal divisions and plant units undoubtedly increased. In 
possessing capacities put at their disposal, they were able to ‘switch over’ to 
manufacture products requested by the market, within relatively short periods o f time. 
For certain enterprises, a venture project function under the direct supervision of the 
head division was set up, endeavouring to exploit the opportunities disclosed by 
market surveys as soon as possible." (Dobak-Tari, 1996: 16) But, as is well known in 
the management literature, the multidivisional model still treats top management as a 
dominant player in business activities. (Forsgen, 1989.) The multidivisional model is 
still very much a hierarchical one: strategies and organisational structures adopted are 
designed by top management, while divisional management is responsible for tactical 
aspects of the firm’s activity and the trouble-free functioning of the site-produetion.
51
Finally, following the brief presentation o f the various forms of organisational 
changes (modernisation) in the former socialist firms in Hungary, it is necessary to 
mention the basic laws which accelerated the restructuring process. Among die legal 
regulations consistent with market institutions, it is worth mentioning the law on the 
‘Transformation of Public Enterprise’[ 1988.VI.Act.) and the new accounting law 
(consistent with the standards of the developed market economies) which was adopted 
at the beginning of 1990 [1991.XVIII.Act.] In spite o f these significant steps in 
modernising organisational structure in the socialist firms, the process of 
deconstructing the bureaucratic and hierarchic type of regulation advanced quite 
slowly until 1990. This means that the so-called ‘intra-organisational networks’ as 
distinctive formal organisational stincture were underdeveloped. For instance, the 
status of the profit-centres which have - in the form of a performance confracts - tight 
relations with the headquarters were at the 'embryo' stage of development at the end of 
1980’s. The key factor in the resistance of the top-management in favouring the profit 
centres model, was the high risk of the possible anarchy and loss of control in the firm 
in the last days o f the socialist political-economic system.
3.2. Is privatisation M agic Tool in the Process of Transformation?
At the beginning of the 1990’s, the majority o f economic policy makers were 
expecting almost automatic performance improvement in the privatised former state 
owned companies and especially in the Hungarian subsidiary units o f multinational 
coiporations (MNCs). The speed of the privatisation process appeared to other social 
actors (e.g., managers, trade union leaders and representatives of academic 
community) as a ‘magic tool’ to create in the short-run a market economy, introducing 
management skill and organisation and through these changes excellent economic 
performance both at firm and national level. Over-emphasising the role o f privatisation
- or in general the changes in the ownership relations - was well reflected in the 
repeated declaration of the prime ministers (since 1990) to speed up privatisation as 
number one priority in developing a market economy. (For instance, the acting Prime
Minister o f Hungary, at the ‘World Economic Forum’ held in Budapest in spring 1995, 
even declared that the privatisation process will be finished in the country by 1997.) In 
addition to diat, among the post-socialist countries of the CEE region, we may observe 
a kind of ‘privatisation competition’ in reading interviews of leading politicians o f the 
countries. In the majority o f cases, piivatisation is treated in these countries as ‘super- 
engine’ or ‘magic-tooF to restructure the former state owned firms, improve efficiency 
and strengthen the institutions o f the young democratic systems. (Kulpinska- 
Cichomski-Morawski, 1996.) Surprisingly, The Financial Tim es’ opinion was also 
rather simplistic and idealistic, but reflecting the general mood or widely shared 
optimistic view at the beginning of the transformation process; „ ... the fall of 
communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe ... has opened the way for privatisation 
of state owned enterprises and assets on an unprecedented scale. With it has come to 
promise o f greater prosperity but above all the chance of creating a property-owning 
middle class to underpin democracy and guarantee the irreversibility of the escape 
from totalitarianism.” ( Ellingstad, 1996: 40.)
The exaggerated belief m the positive social impact o f the privatisation 
systematically neglects the social-organisational and cultural elements o f the 
transformation process. This is not at all an unknown phenomenon in the post-war 
economic history of Hungary and the other CEE countries. Comparing this 
overestimated role o f privatisation with the emergence of the so-called socialist (but in 
reality state) ownership after the Second World War, we have the feeling of ‘Deja Vu’. 
For instance, from the nationalisation/socialisation of the former private-ownership, 
the politicians and firm managers - as the similar social actors today - expected 
radically different workers’ attitudes towards work and company. However, they took 
no account o f the complexity of the social-organisational relations in the firms and the 
presence of the social-cultural ‘fabric’ created by the past and the present experience 
of the social actors.
According to the simplified and ideologically coloured image of the ownership 
changes, the overthrow of private ownership was to have automatically changed the 
confrontational relations based on the different interests o f capital and labour- and 
replace them by the ‘co-operative’ (harmonious) relations in the „worker’s state” . This 
approach did not realise that the managerial and worker’s habits and patterns of 
behaviour are shaped in the production by the various system o f resource-allocation 
within and outside of the firm. (For instance, within the firm, ‘zones o f uncertainty’ or 
the related ‘monopolistic position’ both in the labour' process and the managerial 
organisation created important differences in the ‘informal bargaining positions’. Ln the 
everyday practice of the factoiy society, the labour' process within the socialist firms 
does not cease to exist as an area of social fighting; „core” groups of blue collar 
workers having monopolistic position in the labour process on the shop-floor could 
gain significant financial and non-financial gain from the management at the expense 
of peripheral” workers. (Burawoy-Lukacs, 1989., Hethy-Mako, 1989.)
3.3. Transfer of M anagerial Skill and Organisation and the ‘Knowledge  
Deficiency M od el’
The societies and economies in the former socialist-countries o f CEE are in a 
period of transformation, associated with a search for legitimacy by various social 
actors - both at national and firm (local) level. Acquiring and demonstrating the 
efficient use o f the new market-consistent knowledge and competence represent an 
unprecedented challenge for the various groups of managers (and other social actors, 
too). There is a widely accepted view concerning the managerial responses to these 
challenges created by the transformation process. For instance, in relation with the 
legitimacy search of managers, the following dimensions o f the transformation process 
are strongly emphasised by popular management consultants: the transformation 
process in the post-socialist countries can be seen from the point o f view of the firm as 
a shift from ‘political rationality’ to ‘economic one’. But this shift from one type of 
rationality to another follows an uneven development path, well reflected - among
other tilings - in the various level and pattern o f Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
the quality of management. In Russia, for example, the low rate o f FDI could be 
explained - out o f the well known constraints as the political instability, 
underdeveloped financial institutions, etc. - to the „ ... un satis facto 17 quality of 
management at the level of enterprise, including marketing, poor organisational 
cultures and inadequacy of a significant proportion of top managers.’ (Zaitsev-Uvanov, 
1996: 59.) This view on the post-socialist managers - not only in the case of Russia, 
but in general - is reflected very often in such simplistic assessment that ail are either 
incompetent or lazy to change habits and that simply by replacing them many 
problems will disappear. It is interesting to note, that even in Western Germany, after 
unification (1990), the following opinion became popular not only concerning 
managers but on Eastern German employees in general; „ the eastern workers were 
lazy and would be unable to cope with western working methods and pace ...” 
(Upchurch, 1995: 289.)
These ‘label-type’ approaches to behavioural patterns o f post-socialist managers 
and workers are not based on solid empirical evidences, but explained by mainly 
‘anecdotes’. According to the experiences o f the empirical comparative studies of 
capitalist versus socialist firms confronting similar challenges, the socialist managers 
were quite refined (skilled) to satisfy the following double-requirements: to meet plan 
targets and to guarantee smooth functioning of the labour process within the 
constraints o f the shortage economy (Dubois-Koltay-Mako-Xavier, 1990.) These 
managers, very often demonstrated strong initiatives and high level of flexibility; ‘ ... 
in producing what they could given the many shortages present and were generally 
following the incentives which the system provided, such as striving for quantity over 
quality, lobbying for higher budget from central authorities, bartering with other 
companies over product inputs, etc. (Ellingstad, 1996: 41.)
In spite o f the existence of the valuable skills and great variety o f experiences of 
the former socialist managers, we often met in the literature o f the transformation 
process the quite mechanical approach of transferring western managerial skill and
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organisation into the post-socialist countries. These approaches are influenced by die 
so-called knowledge deficiency model, which assumes that the managers in the post­
socialist firms are deprived from the fundamental elements o f the competence 
necessary under new circumstances of the market economy. (Thompson, 1994.) 
According to the advocates of this model, the remedy to overcome this problem could 
be an extensive reliance on Western consultants and the permanent contacts with the 
managers in the forms o f joint-ventures.
Without denying the lack of important elements o f managerial competence in 
the post-socialist firms, we intend to call attention to the need of systematic empirical 
studies (using comparative perspectives) on the problems related to the organisation 
and management transfer. In addition, the permanent evaluation of the information and 
experiences accumulated by the consulting firms operating in the former socialist 
countries of CEE are valuable resources o f information and knowledge. Unfortunately, 
social scientists are rarely using this rich pool o f information. (E.g., in Hungary - 
among others - the following world largest consulting firms have offices; McKinsey & 
Co., Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche Tohamatsu Int., Coopers & Lybrand, Andersen 
Consulting).
Surveys or observation carried out by a management consulting firm questioned 
the validity of the so-called knowledge deficiency model and instead of that revealed 
not only the complex nature of the transformation process but also the necessity of the 
mutual learning process: both Hungarian and foreign managers have to learn from 
each others (Adorjan-Balaton-Galgoczi-Mako-Temovszky, 1996). In addition, these 
surveys also revealed that the changes in the ownership structure (e.g. privatisation) in 
itself is not enough to improve the performance of the firms. In relation with that, it is 
enlightening to present the diagnosis o f an Austrian based ‘Productivity Consulting 
Firm’ (Czippin and Partner Ltd.) on factors explaining the productivity gap between 
the parent-company (multinational corporations, MNCS) and their Hungarian 
subsidiaries. (Nepszabadsag, 1995:11.) According to the survey, the productivity level 
in the Hungarian sister company represents only 57 % of the same indicator registered
in the parent company. The most significant differences in the level o f productivity 
was found in the case o f  the capital-intensive firms. This means, that die deviation in 
productivity cannot be simply attributed to the lack of investments, but to the problems 
related to the quality o f organisation and managerial work. In the following chapter, 
we try to list, the major sources o f the lower productivity characterising tire Hungar ian 
sister subsidiaries:
1: Foreign firms, during their investments in Hungary, are mainly concentrating on 
radical cost-savmgs and do not pay enough attention to the preparation o f  production, 
and especially disregard the importance o f  training o f  managers and blue-collar 
workers;
2: The policy o f  low wages, with foreign managers not paying enough attention to the 
necessary organisational conditions fo r  the smooth operation;
3: Very often, they are implementing older equipment and machines without the 
necessary 'renewal' before launching production in the Hungarian plants;
4: Introduction o f machines and equipment into the Hungarian plants is organised by 
the help of foreign technicians and managers. Their presence is a source of many 
communication problems, generated not only from  language-related difficulties.;
5: Foreign managers do not elaborate clear requirements fo r  their Hungarian 
employees. Following the Openmg Ceremony Day, employees and workers veiy often 
became disillusioned in the every-day operation;
6: Managers coming from the parent-company, are copying the organisational 
structure (organisation) functioning well in their home-J'irm, without realising the 
different social-cultural environment for the operation in the Hungarian sister 
company;
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7: The managers coming from abroad place too much trust in their computerised 
system, and they visit their Hungarian plants too often, which increases die costs of 
operation;
8: Foreign manager are not well informed about the legal regulations o f  the work­
places. They do not know - or in several cases do not want to respect - the Hungarian 
Labour Code, in relation with the collective bargaining, working time regulation and 
the activity of Trade Unions and Works Council.
The above-listed factors explaining the lower-level of productivity in the 
Hungarian sister-companies of the MNCs are well illustrating the 1knowledge 
deficiency' problems on the side of the parent company managers, too. However, these 
phenomena are not at all unknown m the history of organisational transfer and cannot 
simply be explained by the ‘lack of the necessary competence of managers’ in the 
post-socialist firms. For instance, Louis Renault, the well-known French car maker, 
during his first experiences on introducing ‘Taylorism’ in his factory (1912) did 
confront similar kinds o f organisational (and managerial) problems. One of the major 
sources o f inefficiency was, the fragmented nature o f transfer o f the ‘scientific 
organisation of work’ into his factory (e.g. lack of standardisation of machmes, 
irregularities in the tool supply, lack of adequate training of managers and workers, 
etc.) (Moutet, 1975).
Instead of the simple acceptance or rejection of the so-called knowledge 
deficiency model, it would be more constructive to pay attention both to the structural 
and subjective dimensions of the managerial learning process and the changing content 
of the managerial labour process surveyed. This multi-dimensional approach to study 
the changing and stable elements of the managerial activities may help us to reject the 
various forms of the cultural determinism in relation with transferring manager skills 
and organisation from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries of CEE. On this 
point, we fully agree with the following critics o f  the cultural interpretation ot the
conflicts arising between the native and foreign managers working together in the 
joint-venture firms; „ the differences in business beliefs between Hungarians and 
Americans in an Amencan-owned firm in Hungary may be significant but may pale in 
comparison to the differences between production people and the marketing people in 
the same firm. Managers are constantly told to be aware of and alert to „cultural 
differences” . But differences between individuals from different cultures may be less 
than those individuals from the same one.” (Markoczy, 1996: 10.)
In relation to the West-East transfer of organisation and management, Eastern 
European managers are frequently expected, for instance, to ‘jump from Taylorism, 
Fordism to the flexible-specialisation model’ of manpower and skill use. These 
expectations, often lack the necessary systematic evaluation in the existing structural 
and subjective barriers in advised important shift in the ‘production paradigm’. 
Evaluating the experiences related with the transfer o f managerial skill and 
organisation in the MNCs, and joint-ventures in general, we may stress the highly 
'mutual’ character o f the managerial learning process; both local and foreign managers 
have to learn from each other.
Without questioning the ‘colouring effect’ and ‘visibility’ o f national cultures in 
general and corporate culture in particular, it is necessary to pay more attention to the 
role of the managerial labour process in the process of transferring managerial skill and 
organisation. In this perspective, the next chapter concentrates on the ‘facilitators’ and 
‘constraints’ o f the managerial learning process in the post-socialist countries o f CEE, 
with special attention to Hungary.
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4. Speeding-up the Transfer of M anagerial Skill and Organisation from  
Western to Eastern Europe: Special Focus on Hungary
4.1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as ‘Core Facilitator’ o f  Transferring  
‘M arket-Standard’ Knowledge and Organisation
Evaluating the significance of the role o f FDI, it is necessary to distinguish 
between ‘portfolio’ investment and ‘direct capital investment’. In the first case, the 
investors are buying securities issued by the companies or foreign governments’ bonds, 
but they do not practice ownership rights to control the operation of the foreign 
company. In the second case, investors also intend to practice their ownership rights 
acquired in the foreign company in question. The following types of ‘direct capital 
investments’ could be distinguished (Arva. 1994: 8):
a) Foundation of new companies, mainly in the form of the ‘green-field’ sites;
b) Purchase of a controlling ownership stake in an existing foreign firm;
c) Reinvestment o f profit earned in a foreign company;
d) Lending and raising capital between the parent company and its subsidiary
operating in the foreign country.
FDI is not per se benevolent for the receiving country. Scholars have 
distinguished between ‘colonial type’ capital export and ‘trade generating’ 
investments. Colonial type capital export aims at raw material extraction, etc. and in 
general does not generate a noticeable economic development for the receiving 
country. The so-called trade generating (and not trade substituting) capital investment 
develops export capacities in the target countries and thus gives way to an increase in 
world exports. The South-East Asian countries have received such type of capital 
export from Japan in the early 1970’s before they themselves became export oriented 
countries.
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The transition process related modernisation in the post-socialist countries of 
CEE would be unimaginable without significant FDI and privatisation - in spite of the 
anti-foreign campaign of the populist-nationalist political forces in these countries. For 
instance, in the Hungarian case, foreign-owned firms are producing up to 70 per cent 
of manufactured exports, up from 50 per cent in 1993 and the strongest labour 
productivity increase was experienced in the last five years in the foreign owned joint 
ventures. (Hamori, 1996: 10.) There is a commonly shared hypothesis among 
management scientists (Soulsby-Clark, 1996.) that among the foreign-owned firms, 
MNCs are playing key role in modernising managerial organisation and methods of the 
privatised former large state firms. Moreover, these firms have become not only the 
engines of export performance but have accelerated the introduction of new technology 
and of new managerial methods (.e.g. TQM, team-working, JIT, etc.). Due to the 
important facilitator role o f FDI in shaping the patterns of skill and manpower use, it is 
worth to give a short survey on the FDI in the transformation economies o f the CEE.
Among the post-socialist countries of the region, Hungary received the largest 
portion of the FDI until the middle of 1996; its share represents USD 15.1 billions. 
(But the Czech Republic is beginning to edge out Hungary in the race for FDI . ) The 
distribution of the FDI between economic sectors in the country is the following 
(Nepszabadsag, 1996: 10.):
*  Industry: more than 50 per cent;
■ Telecommunication: 15 per cent;
■ Energy sector: 13 per cent;
■ Financial sector: 6 per cent;
■ Wholesale sector: 6 per cent;
■ Others: 10 per cent.
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The distribution of the FDI within the country is veiy unequal, which further 
strengthens the existing regional inequalities in Hungary. If we are using a three-point 
scale to characterise the level of economic development, three regions should be 
distinguished:
a). ‘Strong regions’;
b). ‘Intermediary regions’;
c). ‘Weak or peripheral’ regions.
The so-called ‘strong regions’ (e.g., the agglomeration of Hungarian capital and 
the Northern Transdanubian regions) received almost as much as three quarters (73.5 
per cent) of the FDI. The ‘intermediary region’ (e.g.^the Great Hungarian Plain) and 
the ‘weak and peripheral’ regions (e.g. the Northern-Eastern Hungary and the 
Southtrans-danubia) have similar share (13 - 13.5 per cent) o f FDI. (Csefalvay, 1993.)
The CEE region has attracted significant amounts o f foreign investment since 
1989, with Hungary received 55 per cent of all long-term FDI in the region, more than 
USD 13 billions by the end of 1995. However, „despite the often cited USD 13 billion 
figure, needs facing the region pale to the capital in-flow. France, for example, has 
received more foreign investment in the last two years than the entire Eastern Block 
has received since 1989.” (Ellingstad, 1996.b.: 8)
Within the broad range of FDI, it is necessary to distinguish between the
investments into ‘green-field’ versus ‘brown-field’ sites. The ‘green-field’ investments 
were carried out by such internationally well-known firms as Suzuki, TDK, Sony, 
General Motors, etc. The ‘brown-field’ investments were carried out by the
privatisation process o f the former state owned firms by such firms as NOKIA,
Siemens, G. E., etc. These two distinctive forms of FDI have different impact on the 
managerial labour process. According to our hypothesis, more balanced disnibution of 
‘green-field’ and ‘brown-field’ investments speed-up the diffusion of modem 
managerial knowledge and organisation. In other words, the diffusion of managerial
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skill and methods will create stronger multiplier or homogenising effects in organising 
economic activities in comparison to domination of either ‘brown-field’ or ‘green­
field’ investments.
The role of FD1 in upgrading quality level o f products, services and 
management is significant not only in the former socialist countries o f CEE but also in 
countries belonging to the matured economies. According to the study made by 
McKinsey, the US management consultants, more than two-thirds o f UK suppliers, 44 
per cent of US suppliers and 85 per cent of Japanese suppliers received this evaluation. 
Top management in the UK car component industry „has ... devoted itself intensely to 
quality, more than that o f any other country in Europe”, says the report. According to 
McKinsey, the driving force behind the change in Britain has been the influence o f  car 
plants set up by Japanese groups. They have made ,, upping quality levels . . . a  matter 
o f  survival fo r  British suppliers ", says the report. German companies, in contrast, have 
lacked this stimulus. The report says their ,,catch-up effort will need to begin with a 
drastic reduction in current levels o f over complexity ... and a focus on strategically 
important (management) levels (for change). In the case o f Germany, „top management 
commitment to quality which has been only average to date, will need to greatly 
increase”, the report warns, while companies will also need to follow the UK example 
of operating more „team-working” on factory floors to harness the „problem solving” 
skills of employees. (Marsh, 1996.)
Before presenting the pattern of FDI in the so-called ‘Visegrad countries’, it is 
interesting to have a look on the general weight of FDI, measured by USD/per capita:
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Table 10 Foreign Direct Investment (FDH : 1995
Countries in USD per capita
Hungary 1.410
Czech Republic 563
Poland 177
Slovakia 138
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996: 39.
Following the earlier presented hypothesis, the simultaneous and balanced 
presence of ‘green-field’ and ‘brown-field’ investments have stronger ‘harbinger 
effect’ in diffusing new managerial skills and practices than the one-sided dominance 
of either ‘green-field’ or ‘brown-field’ investments. In relation to that, we may 
elaborate the following hypothesis: in a post-socialist country, where the ‘mono- 
pattern’ of FDI is dominant (either in the form of ‘green-field’ or ‘brown-field’ sites), 
the multiplier effects o f FDI on the business performance (e.g. labour productivity) is 
more limited (creating only islands of use modem management methods and 
technology) compared with the presence of ‘hetero-pattern’ o f FDI.
Comparing the 10 top investments in the two ‘Visegrad countries’ having the 
highest per capita FDI, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we may identify significant 
differences, see the tables 11 and 12.
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Table 11 Ten top investments in Czech Republic
Investor (country) T arget Commitment Sector
l .Tel source (NL, CH) SPT Telecom USD 1.423 111 telecommunication
2. Volkswagen (G) Skoda Auto lL s 962 ill automobile
3. International Oil (NL.USA) Unipetrol USD 615 m petroleum
4. Philip Morris (USA) Tabak USD 500 m tabacco
5. Steyr (A - Daewo-K) Avia USD 384 m automobile
6.IFC Kaiser (USA) Nova Huta USD 231 in steel
7. Linde (G.) Teclinoplvn USD 154 m industrial gas
S. Energy consortium (USA) Energeticke centrum USD 154 m energy
9. Pepsi-Cola (USA) Green-field site USD 120 m softdnnk
10. Gloverbel (Belgium) Glasunion USD 115 m glass
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996: 54.
Table 12 Ten top investments in Hungary
Investors (country) Target Commitment Sector
1. Magyar Com.(G., USA) Matav USD 875 m telecommunication
2. General Electric (USA) Tungsram USD 600 m lighting
3. AUDI (G) Green-field site USD 530 m automobile
4. General Motors (USA) Green-field site USD 283 m automobile
5. Suzuki (Japan) Green-field site USD 280 m automobile
6. Douwe-Egbert (NL) Compack USD 150 m food
7.UNILEVER (NL, UK) Green-field site USD 150 m consumer goods
8. ALCOA (USA) Kofem USD 146 in aluminium
9. Pepsi-Cola (USA) Green-field site USD 135 m softdrink
10. AEGON International (NL) AB-Aegon USD 135 in insurance
Source: Business Central Europe, 1996: 54.
In Hungary, not only in the case of the 10 top investments, but also in the whole 
process of privatisation (See Chapter 2), the more balanced distribution of FDI (or 
‘hetero-pattern’ of FDI) and greater variety in ownership and organisational forms 
have speed up the managerial learning process and created different ‘priority list’ of 
managerial problems in the Hungarian firms compared to the other countries of CEE. It
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is extremely difficult to get reliable information on the uneven pace of the managerial 
learning process.
Until now we have very few sectoral or (regional) oriented comparative studies 
on the firm-level transformation process in the post-socialist countr ies of CEE. In the 
next section, we present the main results of an international comparative survey on 
ownership and organisational restructuring process related management problems in 
the ‘Visegrad-countnes’. Following the presentation of some relevant tendencies 
discovered in this study, we intend to describe the forms and tools of the managerial 
skills and organisation.
4.2. Uneven Developm ent of the M anagerial Learning Process: Lessons from 
the ‘Hokkaido Project’
The Hokkaido Project initiated survey was conducted in Spring of 1996 in the 
firms employing at least 500 employees in the machine industrial sector in the 
‘Visegrad countries’. [1] During the survey, each national team participating in the 
Project, used the same structured interview conducted with top mangers of the firms 
surveyed (usually general director) concerning the following items:
■ corporate governance;
■ patterns of communication channels;
■ current business performance and main effecting factors;
■ finn-level labour relations;
■ influence distribution in the decision making system.
In relation to transferring managerial skills and organisation from Western 
Europe into the post-socialist countries of CEE, the focus of analysis will be centred 
on changing managerial task and knowledge structure to map the possible uneven 
development in the managerial learning process.
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According to the ‘Hokkaido survey’, 54.4 per cent of the Hungarian managers 
interviewed classify their firm ’s state of business achievement as successfu l”, a figure 
■considerably higher than the 25.4 per cent average for the other three Visegrad 
countries. (See Table 13).
Table 13 Present state of business achievement
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia
Successful 20.0 % 54.4 % 43.3 % 13.0%
Recovering 56.6 % 34.3 % 46.6 % 60.9 %
Stagnant 16.7 % 8.6 % 6-7 % 21.7%
Declining 6.7 % ' 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 5
On the verge of bankruptcy 0.0 % 2.9 % 3.3 % 0.0 %
Source: The Hokkaido Project (1996)
While such bright figures may seem counterintuitive given Hungary’s very 
lackluster GDP and employment growth figures, this can partly be explained by the 
very uneven patterns o f economic recovery in this country - both by regions and 
sectors - and also the relatively large role foreign capital has played in transforming 
Hungary’s machine industry. (37 per cent of Hungarian firms are majority foreign- 
owned, compared with 6.6 per cent in Poland, 3.3 per cent in the Czech Republic, and
8.3 per cent in Slovakia.) The findings of this survey are backed by other independent 
surveys, including a 1048-firm survey, which reveals lags, both between 
manufacturing and non-manufactunng firms, and foreign-owned firms (which are 
mostly manufacturing) and domestic firms. Further, despile weak macro-level 
economic performance, there are indeed areas - particularly in export oriented 
manufacturing - which give cause fo r  optimism. The utilisation o f  many me so-level and
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firm-level viewpoints may in (he end be more telling than broad, macro-level figures 
most casual observers rely on.
The uneven development of organising economic activities in the past and the 
variety in the privatisation process after 1990, have strong impact on the speed of the 
managerial learning process. The unequal stages in the development of the 
management skills and organisations are well reflected in the differences identified in 
the prioritised list o f measures taken by firm ’s management in the machine industry. 
For instance, in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, managers 
interviewed still place a high priority (ranked second in all o f these three countries) on 
employment reduction, commonly associated as a ‘firm-internal transformational 
‘problems. Hungarian managers, on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on 
product and market-oriented issues: customers and suppliers, R & D, and the increase 
of exports are the primary focal points. Dividing the list o f  measures into two rough 
categories, firm  internal transformation' and ‘market/product oriented’, and  
summing responses, one finds that Hungary scores much lower in ‘transjormational' 
measures, 37.6 per cent in Hungary compared to 63.3 per cent in Poland, 56.9 per  
cent in the Czech Republic, and 58 per cent in Slovakia.
This may be the result o f either, or both, of the two factors:
• Hungarian firms in the machine industrial sector are slightly ahead of other 
Visegrad firms in transforming their enterprises, because of a more 
ambitious privatisation program (while a slightly higher proportion of all 
Czech business are privately owned, the networks o f investment fund and 
bank ownership make for a more convoluted owner-management behaviour) 
and a higher degree of foreign ownership; and/or
• Firm, ‘internal-transformational’ issues in Hungarian firms are dwarfed by 
‘market-oriented’ problems caused by the break-up of the COMECON
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(former economic integration institution: „CounciI for Mutual Economic 
Aid”) trading regime. Hungary has neither the large internal market of 
Poland (noticeable in the relatively smaller importance given to exports by 
Polish firms) nor the stronger history of export-orientation for the machine 
industry that Czechoslovakia had within the former COMECON.
Aldiough Hungarian firms arguably face more difficult market conditions for 
their products, for both geographic and economic reasons, the likely fundamental 
reason for the differing emphasis o b serv ed  lies fundamentally in the temporal 
component having to do with the particularities o f the different market environments. 
While Hungary and Poland experienced what is politely called „shock therapy”, 
Poland’s slower privatisation regime and slightly more protectionist trade laws at the 
outset of the transformation provided a larger cushion - and a lower set of incentives to 
transform the firm - than was presented to Hungarian firms. Both the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia experienced sharp falls in demand, but as alluded to earlier, firms owned 
by investment funds have often been m the functional equivalent of privatisation half­
way house. The differences are temporal in that the general goals, broadly defined, 
will be reached by all Visegrad countries in the not too distant future (it is important to 
keep in mind that this enormous transformation project was embarked upon but a few 
years ago). To the extent that one gives credence to this explanation, one also assumes 
that the vast majority o f these Hungarian firms have already more or less turned the 
comer, while other Visegrad firms are to varying extent still engaged in, and beginning 
to emerge from, the process of fundamental transformation.
It is worth noting that a surprisingly large number o f Hungarian managers 
surveyed in machine industry reported to have increased efforts on research and 
development, which may also be seen as a sign that crisis times in the machine 
industry are over (as returns on R & D outlays usually accrue in the longer-term, 
beyond the horizon of a firm struggling just to survive). In the last decade, R & D 
activities in Hungarian firms have declined precipitously, with 57 per cent o f firms 
claiming no R& D activity whatsoever, and there have been fears that Hungary is
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losing its R & D capacity, both as a result o f economic stagnation and the tendency of 
foreign firms to build manufacturing capacity in Hungary, but keep R & D functions 
near company headquarters. However, two large companies, AUDI and General 
Electric (GE), have recently announced plans to move R & D facilities to Hungary, to 
be closer to their factories there. The degree to which the CEE countries are able to 
compete on more favourable terms of trade will depend largely on their ability to be 
price and quality-competitive not just in manufacturing, but also in innovation.
A glance at current capacity utilisation illustrates the relatively successful 
restructuring process o f  management and organisation in the Hungarian machine 
industiy. See table 14.
Table 14.______ _________ Current capacity utilisation
Capacity
utilisation
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
0 - 10 % - - - -
11 - 20 % - 3 % - -
21 30% - - - -
3 1 - 4 0 % 3.7 % 3 . 0% 3 . 0% -
4 1 - 5 0 % 14.8 % 8.8 % 13.3 % -
51 - 6 0 % 14.8 % - 20.0 % 16.7 %
6 1 - 7 0 % 14.8 % 14.7 % 16.7% 27.8 %
7 1 - 8 0 % 22.2 % 14.7 % 33.3 % 27.8 %
8 1 - 9 0 % 18.5 % 20.6 % 13.3 % 11.1 %
91 . 100% 11.1 % 35.3 % - 16.7 %
Average: 73.1 % 81.6% 68.5 % 71.5 %
Source: The Hokkaido Project. 1996.
With an average utilisation rate o f 81.6 per cent, Hungary falls comfortably 
within OECD averages, and provides added proof that in this sector anyway, the 
depths of the crisis have already been reached. O f special note is the fact that fully
35.3 per cent of firms are operating at 91 - 100 per cent capacity, and a majority of 
firms (55.9 per cent) are operating above 81 per cent of capacity.
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4.3. Facilitators of the New Managerial Methods: Co-operative Patterns of 
Labour Relations in the Hungarian Firms
Both forms of employee participation, the direct and the representative 
(indirect) participation were widespread in Hungarian business organisations. The 
most important direct form  was realised in experiments with autonomous working 
groups, group-level decisions on wage distribution, group based cost saving centres, 
internal subcontracting system, and especially in its most widespread and publicised 
version (VGMKs) in the 1980’s (See the 1.3. Section of the Final Report.) The 
growing role o f trade union representation expressed in the different shop steward and 
firm level union committee rights since the middle of the 1970's together with the 
creation of the Enterprise Councils as quasi-self governing bodies m the second half of 
the 1980’s were the most significant development of indirect participation. Trade 
unions having gradually obtained their participating and bargaining rights were 
anxious to see how other direct forms of employee participation and non-union 
representation (e.g., Enterprise Council) were introduced in the industrial practice. 
They were afraid of losing their newly acquired functions in employee representation 
that was a well known phenomenon of the labour relations system in the industrialised 
countries. In Hungary their position was more troublesome as they were still in a 
politically dependent position until 1989 and they felt threatened more by non union 
controlled representation and direct participative forms (or new human resources 
management techniques) designed to create direct ‘dialogue’ between management and 
union making trade union role unnecessary since the 1980’s.
Research experiences proved that in Hungary employee participation in its very 
different forms has been a key element o f labour relations since the 1970’s. Its 
different forms partially substituted the autonomous institution of collective bargaining 
and labour disputes and together with informal mechanisms of interest conciliation 
contributed to the stability and flexibility of the labour process and created lasting 
practice of co-operation between the social partners at firm-level. (Ishikawa, 1992.) 
The tight labour market situation and organisational problems (e.g., frequent bottle
73
necks in the production process) generated by the shortage economy in die labour 
process strengthened the informal bargaining position of certain working groups 
playing key role in solving diem. The enlarged possibilities of participation at firm- 
level smce the 1970's helped certain employee groups to accumulate important social 
skills in evaluating and manipulating social and organisational situations, in 
negotiating widi different social partner and in elaborating overall views of the 
enterprises and their environment. The same experiences called attention to the limits 
of participation and showed which missing elements o f the labour relations system 
hinder the widening and more efficient use of the firm level participation regimes.
Since 1988/89, the innovations o f the renewed autonomous labour relations 
system have become especially important in a situation of overall changes in the 
Hungarian economy when property relations went through a comprehensive 
transformation, when public firms were privatised and a new private sector has grown 
up, when decentralisation o f former large organisations was carried out while a deep 
economic recession damaged almost all spheres of the economy. The circumstances of 
these unstable economic conditions and of the huge social costs o f transformation paid 
for by large groups, the new elements of labour relations helped to maintain stability 
and sometimes even to resolve critical situations o f social unrest.
At first glance after the transformation participation on firm-level seemed to 
lose its importance. There were (and still are) certain signs pertaining to the 
diminishing importance of firm level negotiations and bargaining (in formal and 
informal ways) under the pressure o f the new phenomenon of high unemployment and 
weak labour markets. Others are supposing that with private ownership, real owners 
controlling management eager to „import” the well-known managerial methods and 
techniques of firm level negotiation for m anufacturing consent” without the presence 
of trade unions. (Poor, 1993.)
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Apart from these assumptions - that we shall attempt to refute later on - the 
location of participation in the Hungarian labour relations system has certainly 
changed. First of all, it has lost its political and ideological significance - local 
employer-employee conflicts can hardly be transposed into basic social conflicts as 
during the socialism. Its functions connected to firm level issues became more 
circumscribed. Meanwhile the social and political positions o f the partners were reset 
on firm level due to the appearance of direct private property, to the definite 
disappearance of „mythologies” of work and „class approach”, to the declining 
production because of the deepening recession and due to the new institutions and 
legal possibilities to influence decisions or protest at firm-level.
A view widely accepted among labour relations experts is that, m periods of 
recession, when unemployment increases, the number of strikes diminishes. This is 
taken to be a sign of the weak bargaining positions of employees and their unions. 
Without denying the weakening bargaining positions o f employees within the 
circumstances o f weak labour market, it is worth to call attention the continuity the 
pattern of co-operation in the Hungarian firm-level labour relations. For instance, 
comparing the Hungarian and Polish strike statistics we fmd clear differences m the 
patterns of labour relations, in spite of similarly high levels of unemployment. In 
Hungary, where strike activity remained rather low compared to the other CEE 
countries, the most important strikes were organised in the state-owned branches like 
railway transportation, energy sector and education. See Table 15.
Table 15 Strikes in Hungary and Poland
Countries N um ber o f  strikes Number o f  participants (in thousands)
1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993
Hungary •*5J 10 17 250 25 - 30 20
Poland 305 ■ 6362 7362 221 730 382
Source: Heti Vilaggazdasag (Economic Weekly), 1994. No766. Februar 24.
(Ha mar elhallgat a csend)
Note: Unfortunately we have no comparative data on 1994, 1995 and 1996, but the number of strikes 
in Hungary after 1993, do not show different tendencies.
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The other distinctive feature of the Hungarian Labour Relations was discovered 
by the International W orker’s Attitude Survey. This Project was initiated in 1984 by 
the Denki Rengo Japanese Trade Union Confederation, operating in the electric and 
electronic industry. In 1994/95 the 1984 survey was repeated using the same research 
techniques and investigating the same firms. The core aim of this international survey 
was to map the impact of the changes which were taking place in Western Europe, 
Japan and in the former socialist countries on firm level labour relations. Some 
characteristics of the changes were similar' (e.g., internationalisation of the national 
economies, unequal weakening of the fordist-production paradigm, declining trade 
union influence), other by and large restricted to the post-socialist countries like 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia participated in the original survey, too (e.g., economic 
restructuring combined with privatisation of the state ownership, shifting market 
orientation from the former-socialist countries to the market o f the developed 
economies, etc.)
The evaluation of the international survey has not yet been finished, but we may 
mention some noticeable changes and continuities in the patterns o f  firm-level labour 
relations. To illustrate these changes in comparing the Hungarian data of 1984 and 
1994 surveys, it is worth mentioning the following: the overall degree of unionisation 
is decreasing in Hungaiy. But in the privatised firms surveyed in electric and electronic 
industry, the degree of unionisation remained rather high (71.3 per cent) - compared to 
other countries participating in the international project. The most interesting finding is 
that in spite to the growing autonomy of trade unions, the pattern ten years ago 
identified pattern o f  double loyalty or ‘hierarchical identity' shows a sign o f  strong 
continuity. See the tables 16 and 17.
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Table 16 Question: 'How far does the decision of your local union
reflect your opinions?
Answers 1984’s Survey 1994’s Survey
(I) Very well + (2)Fairly well 33.2 % 54.5 %
(3) Nat very well +  (4) Not at all 18.9 % 30.7 %
(5) I do not expect anything 10.4% 12.9 %
No answer ' 37.5 % 1.9 5
Total 594 411
Table 17 Question: ’How far does the decision of management 
in your plant reflect your opinions?
Answers 1984’s Survey 1994’s Survey
(1) Very well - (2) Fairly well 45.2 % 55.7 %
(3) Not very well - (4) Not at all 23.4 % 35.0 %
(5) I do not expect anything 4.4 % 7.5 %
No answers 26.1 % 1.7 %
Total 594 411
Source; Mako. Cs. (1996) ‘Transformation Process in CEE: Continuity and Changes in the Institution
Building1, International Workshop on New Dialogue Between CEE and Japan. Budapest. 16- 
19 September, p. 10.
This strengthening phenomena of double loyalty or hierarchical identity o f  
employees is based on ‘economic rationality' (helping the company's survival and 
through this keeping employment) in 1994, instead o f  the ‘ideological loyalty' 
discovered ten years ago, (Ishikawa, 1992: 88-91). The ‘economic rationality’ which 
is - among other things - well reflected in the pattern of the ‘double-loyalty’ could be 
explained by the ‘mini-co-operativism’ which is shaped largely by the present 
transformational crisis related high level of unemployment. In these circumstances, the 
employees tend to identify with ‘their’ firm ’s future to stabilise employment. They 
agree with the flexible use of manpower and skill if  the management also do their best 
for the success of the company. This pattern of co-operation creates favourable social- 
organisational (or even cultural) conditions for the new-type interest alliance between 
managers and rank-and-file employees, based on die so-called ‘productivity coalitions' 
between social partners at firm-level. (Streeck, 1993: 60-62). The co-operative pattern
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of firm-level labour relations based on 'productivity coalitions’ cannot simply be 
interpreted as the simple ‘institutional heritage’ of the socialist past. It is necessary to 
call attention to the new elements o f employee participation which are the social 
products of the spreading innovative - or several cases ‘re-labelled’ - human resource 
management techniques and initiatives (e.g. team-working, improving employee’s 
participation, combining functional flexibility with the labour market one etc.). In the 
vacuum of Labour Relations immediately after the political transformation, the need 
for everyday communication and problem solving increased the importance of the 
direct dialogue between managers and various employees groups. Spreading forms of 
team-work, ‘lean’ and ‘flatter’ organisations with reduced number o f hierarchic levels, 
developing ‘heterarchic relations’ within the organisation, reorganisation of the firm ’s 
communication system, relying on Works Councils instead of Trade Unions, 
diversification of employment contracts, introducing ISO systems, etc., are on the list 
of new managerial initiatives. In relation to the transfer of new managerial concepts - 
where the MNCs are the pioneers - both foreign and domestically-owned firm 
management did not met significant resistance in Hungary and other CEE countries 
from the part o f the rank-and-file employee. But, in some cases, it is difficult to 
introduce new managerial concepts and approaches. For instance, the well known 
French multinational, the LAFARGE-group met the following difficulties 
implementing ‘participative’ management in its Polish plant: „ ... it is not easy to 
implement the dynamism o f our participative management. It is simply to understand 
the blockage, in the past, Polish managers behaved as simple operators without 
criticising the decisions, they did not even express their opinions ... „ (Piot, 1996: 11)
The Hokkaido Project produced interesting findings having important impact on 
the management initiatives in shaping social relations at firm-level. Given Poland’s 
recent history of comparatively higher strike rates, it should come as no suiprise that 
Poland’s composite labour score is significantly above the other Visegrad countries. 
An interesting comparison can be made between Hungary, which has the lowest 
composite labour- score, and Poland, as both countries have quite weak labour market. 
See table 18.
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Table 18 Bottom-up communication channels on wage-related issues
Form of 
communication
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Via labour union 46.7 % 28.6 % 77.6 % 47.8 5
Via Works Council 0.0 % 28.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Via foreman or shop- 
floor chief
30.0 % 5.7 % 23.3 % 30.4 %
Via informal leader 0.0 % 14.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Directly and indivi­
dually by workers
20.0 % 11.4% 0.0 % 13.0%
Other 3.3 % 11.4% 0.0 % 8.7 %
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996.
Table 18 illustrates well that Poland and Hungary represent the two extreme 
patterns of ‘bottom-up’ communication channels concerning wage-related issues. In 
the Polish case, this type of communication channel is controlled mainly by the trade 
unions, and to smaller extent by the foreman, representing officially recognised 
institutions. In the Hungarian case, the more polarised communication channels are 
functioning: besides the divided role of trade unions and Works councils, the 
individual ‘voice’ of unofficial leader or individual workers are playing significant role 
also. The Czech and Slovakian patterns are very similar: union-foreman-direct 
‘triangular’ worker participation is the dominant features without the role of 
‘unofficial leaders’.
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4.4. Consulting Firms and Joint-Ventures as Core Vehicles o f  Transferring  
M anagerial Skill and Organisation
Before presenting empirical evidence related to the managerial skill and 
organisational transfer (e.g., the roles of the Western European or local consulting 
firms, activities of joint-ventures) it is necessary to revise the key dimensions of the 
learning process in the organisations * presented in the introductory section of die 
Report. Concerning knowledge - which is the primary product o f this learning process
- we intend to use the distinctions made by Polanyi. (1969). He distinguished between 
‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ knowledge. Only the explicit, formulable core knowledge can be 
transferred neutrally, from person to person without particular loss and social 
difficulties. But whole explicit knowledge is unthinkable, it is not identical with the 
verbalised and formulated version of the tacit skill which is belonging to someone 
(either individual or group). Studying the managerial learning process, we have to be 
aware of this very complex nature of human knowledge. The success o f knowledge 
transfer does not depend on exclusively on the elaborated character o f manuals and 
other forms of knowledge and skill transfer. As Polanyi (1967) stated, „ ... tacit 
thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, than the ideal o f eliminating all 
personal elements o f knowledge would in effect, aim at the destruction of all 
knowledge” .
In the practice o f firm-level training and skill formation it is worthwhile to make 
distinctions among the international patterns o f technology and knowledge transfer. 
These methods could be divided into the following three major categories (Kasahara- 
Mako, 1996:51-52):
1) Where technology exists m an objectively and explicitly stated forms, such as 
patents, diagrams and manuals, and these are used to transfer the technology;
2) Where machines and equipment are transferred and technology that is pait of 
them transferred;
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3) Where technology that is integral to human (or human organisations) is 
transferred through direct On the Job Training (OJT), by using or dispatching 
people.
It is said that the Japanese firm ’s characteristic pattern o f developing 
technology, along with this process of establishing a Japanese style production system, 
has had a great deal of influence on the fact that Japanese firms rely greatly on 
technology transfer which cemres on the exchange of people and On the Job Training, 
rather than (or along with) manual based training. Analysing the managerial learning 
process, we distinguished between not only the explicit (formalised) and tacit forms of 
human knowledge but also its technical-professional” and „social-cultural” ones. (See 
table 1 in the introductory chapter). In the case o f managerial skill, the techn ical- 
professional” dimension relates to the various working techniques (methods), the 
„social~cultural” one represents the social competence of management to ‘manipulate’ 
the social relations or ‘fabric’ within the business organisation. (In addition, these 
briefly presented dimensions o f human knowledge have both individual and collective 
character, this distinction helps us to understand the psychological and social-cultural 
elements of the managerial learning process.)
This chapter deals with the problems related to the transfer o f managerial skill 
and organisation from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries of CEE, 
focusing mainly on Hungary. During this analysis, we try to use the earlier presented 
distinctions on human knowledge as a kind of background concept. In presenting the 
„vehicles” o f the managerial skill and organisation transfer (e.g., Western consulting 
firms' activity, joint-ventures etc.), it is worth noting that in the centre o f our interest is 
management as a labour process. At the beginning of this Report, we presented a 
detailed description of the managerial functions as components o f the managerial 
labour process. Without duplicating this presentation, it is necessary to stress again, 
that the uneven development in the managerial labour process (e.g., governance, 
administrative, production and innovative functions, etc.) during the state-socialism
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period within CEE has strong impact (following the logic of ‘path dependence’) on the 
present course o f the management and organisation development.
4,4.1. Western Consulting Firms as Vehicles of the New M anagerial Skill
and Organisation
There is a commonly shared view among management scientists concerning the 
core role of western consulting fiims in transferring market-standard knowledge from 
matured market economies to the post-socialist countries o f CEE. (Thompson, 1994). 
According to the mainstream approach, consulting activity offers services for a variety 
of clients: business organisations operating in manufacturing or service sector, firms 
before and after privatisation, newly created organisations etc. To evaluate the 
activities of western management consulting firm, we have to rely on the available, and 
very often non-systematic empirical evidences.
It is necessary to mention that in Hungary and in the other countries o f the 
region, the well-known international consulting fiims, offering a wide range of 
services are present without exception (see the 4.1 section) together with local 
consulting companies. In relation to transferring managerial skill and organisation, it is 
worth asking why business organisations are hiring western or national (local) 
consul ting firms. Table 19 contains information collected from the very rare nation­
wide survey carried out in Hungary on the motifs of selecting consulting firms.
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Table 19 Motifs o f Hiring Management Consulting Firms (1990-1993)
Topics of consulting Western Consulting Firms
(n=33)
Hungarian Consulting 
Firms(24)
Internal restructuring 15 % 15 %
Strategy 17% 13 %
Marketing 5 % 5 %
Finance 5 % 6 %
Privatisation 18 % 19%
Information technology 8 % 8 %
Taxation 1 % 1 0 %
Personnel and mgt.training 4 % 3 %
Auditing 8 % 6 %
Evaluation 19% 17%
Total (n=110) 100% (n=62) 100 %
Source: Hovanyi, G. (194) ‘Investigating the Efficiency o f  W estem-European Consulting Firms
Working for East-European Companies’, Research Grant from  ACE 1992Program. Pecs:
Janus Pannonius University - Faculty o f  Economics, Department o f  Industrial Economic 
Studies, p. 9-10.
Analysing the total number o f 172 contracts signed by Hungarian business 
organisations - which are operating in both manufacturing and service sectors - we 
may draw the following conclusions: the Western management firms are ‘strong’ in the 
following fields: ev a lua tion”, privatisation”, „advise on strategy” and „intemal 
restructuring” Comparing the services given by Western and Hungarian consulting 
firms, the later ones have better position advising on „taxation” . The better position of 
the national consulting firms could be attributed to the fact that the local consulting 
experts are better informed and equipped with ‘social-cultural’ skill to follow the 
permanently changing taxation rules. Evaluating the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ points o f the 
Western consulting firms in comparison with the local consulting firms, we may say 
that their competitive advantage is based on the capacity to combine the knowledge of 
the locally hired staff widi the large-pool of their internationally-proven knowledge. 
Their weakness could be attributed to the often experienced rigidity in solution
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presentation: „ ... their suggestions are quite schematic: they follow always the same 
models, not taking into account the conditions of changing environments ... during the 
phase of fact finding of the consulting process the Western firms did not perceive the 
consequences of the (former) state regulations - therefore their suggestions have been 
particularly inadequate. „ (Hovanyi, 1994: 19-20)
The brief presentation of the ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ points o f the knowledge 
transfer role of Western consulting firms calls our attention to distinguish between the 
types of knowledge or solutions advised to implement in the post-socialist business 
organisations. In the introductory remarks of this chapter, we recommended 
distinguishing between ^technical-professional” and „social-culturar components of 
human knowledge. Using this distinction, we may assert that the Western consulting 
firms had not met particular resistance or difficulties in transferring the techn ical- 
professional” components o f their solutions. As a Hungarian consulting expert noticed: 
„New-comers from the West can be successful consulting firms in Hungary only when 
solving clear-cut professional problems (e.g., ‘Fully Automated Warehouse System ') 
or when using truly international techniques fo r  international purposes (e.g., 'Making 
a Balance Sheet According to International Financial Statem ents'). In other areas only 
those Western consulting firms which have professionals living in Hungary for longer 
period and being already well acquainted with legal and economic labyrinth of an 
economy in transition can be successful.” (Hovanyi, 1994: 47). In relation with the 
second part of the remark in quotation, it is necessary to add that not only the ‘legal 
and economic labyrinth o f an economy in transition’ but the social and cultural 
'embedded’ nature o f the transformational economies present a significant challenge 
for Western consulting firms operating in the post-socialist countries o f CEE.
Concentrating only on the technical-professional” side o f their propositions 
and not taking into considerations their „social-cultural fabric” , would produce failure 
for Western consulting firms. Evaluation of consulting contracts signed with major 
Western consulting firms (dominated by US, UK and German companies) four years 
after the collapse o f the state-socialist political-economic regime, suggests that the
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successful consulting firms were aware of the crucial importance of the so c ia l-  
cultural” dimension of the managerial learning process. For instance, the majority of 
contacts were signed by those Western management consulting organisations which 
have permanent local branch offices in Hungary. See Table 20.
Table 20 No. of Contracts Signed with Western Management Consulting Firms
(1990 -1993)
Nationality of 
Consultmg Firms
No. o f Contracts Per cent of 
Contracts
No. o f HBO 
Contracts (+)
Austrian 8 7 7
Canadian 2 2 1
French 2 2 2
German 19 17 15
British 25 23 19
Irish 1 1 -
Dutch 1 I -
American (USA) 52 47 44
Total 110 100 88
Note: (+) HBO= Contracts signed with Western consulting firms having Hungarian Branch Office
(HBO). Source: Hovanyi. 1994; 11.
The earlier-mentioned difficulties of the Western consultmg firms operating in 
Hungary (e.g., lack of local knowledge, weak sensitivity or open-mindedness in several 
cases to focal contexts) is not at all a ‘Hungarian-syndrome’. The firm-level surveys 
earned out in the other countries of CEE have identified similar patterns. For example, 
in the Czech Republic, the Western consulting firms accepted well are those which 
employ local experts. (Soulsby-Clark, 1996.) Disposing well-developed local, so c ia l-  
cultural” knowledge is especially strongly recommended for those Western consulting 
firms which intend to operate not only in private but also in the public sector. In this 
sector, the domestic consulting firms, having intimate knowledge of the social-political
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contexts of the public institutions (e.g., city government-owned facilities) are better 
placed to implement in a more flexible way the necessary changes.
Summing up the experiences collected on the role of the Western consulting 
firms in transferring new managerial skill and organisation (e.g., auditing, development 
strategy, internal restructuring, taxation etc.) we may discover various patterns. For 
instance, concerning the technical-professional” elements o f the necessary new 
knowledge and working methods, Western consulting firms had an excellent and 
proven international ‘reservoir’ of experiences to elaborate the right ‘therapy’ and 
'diagnosis’ for Hungarian clients. This is the case m such fields of activities as 
auditing, evaluation, development o f financial information systems and schemes for 
management and personnel training. In regards to the „social-cultural” dimension of 
the transformation process, the majority of Western consulting firms very soon 
recognised the ‘strategic importance’ of employing local staff to overcome their 
(natural) shortcomings in this field. It is not by chance that the most successful 
international consulting firms, very soon following their introduction mto the 
Hungarian market, established then- branch offices, employing mainly local experts. 
This approach of combining technical-professional” and „social-cultural” knowledge 
became a facilitating factor in transferring various elements o f the new managerial skill 
and organisations necessary for business organisations operating in the market 
environment. However, the assistance and support o f the Western or local management 
consulting firms is temporary and lack the stability and permanent feed-back in the 
managerial learning process. Now we turn our attention to the role of ‘joint-ventures’ 
which symbolise a stable and permanent form of transferring new managerial concepts 
and organisation.
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4.4.2. Joint-Ventures as Tools of Transferring M anagerial Skill and
Organisation
There is a shared common view among the management scientists on the 
following role o f the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): they are ‘facilitators1 of 
transferring management skill and organisation from the matured market economies 
into the emerging, new market economies in the CEE region. (Child-Markoczy, 1993,, 
Soulsby-Clark, 1996). Within the CEE countries - as we have earlier illustrated - 
Hungary remained the favourite target of FDI, landing approximately USD 13.1 
billion by the beginning of 1996. However, the FDI inflows to Hungaiy appear to be 
slowing while to other countries m the region are increasing rapidly (e.g., the second 
most popular countiy for FDI is the Czech Republic, which received USD 5.6 billions 
until January 1996. (Frances, 1996:4) Table 21 sums up the latest available data of 
FDI on the former socialist countries, including Russia.
Table 21 Foreign Direct Investment (FDD in the former Socialist Countries
(in USD mn)
Countries 1994 1995 1996 (March)
Czech Republic 3,077 5,797 5,955
Hungary ■ 7,087 11,919 13,100
Poland 1,521 2,655
Slovak Republic 531 728 737
Slovenia 424 600 614
Bulgaria 247 337 397
Romania 552 971 1,006
Croatia 185 265 192
Russia 3,496 5,513 5,900
Source: The Central European Productivity Reporter: Economic Trends,
November 1996. P 3,
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In relation with FDI, it is worth mentioning the diversity of privatisation 
schemes and their effects on die scale of ownership. Compared with other CEE 
countries, the Hungarian privatisation process has on whole provided the most 
extensive shifting of ownership of state firms to private sector: „After initially utilising 
‘spontaneous’ pnvatisation, Hungary has used the so-called ‘strategic’ privatisation 
method, whereby the willingness and capacity to mvest in the private company is often 
given as much weight as the actual bid price. This method tends to favour larger, 
foreign investors as opposed to, for example, Czech coupon privatisation, which tends 
to concentrate control in the hands of banks and investment funds, often via domestic 
investors. As such, post privatised companies in Hungary generally offer a cleaner, 
more visible contrast to their predecessors than in the Czech Republic, where the 
picture is more blurry because o f  slower, more convoluted changes in management 
structures. „ (Ellingstad, 1996.b 41) The pattern o f ‘strategic privatisation’ attracted a 
significant size of FDI in Hungary and speeded up the managerial leammg process in 
the foreign-owned firms in comparison with the Hungarian owned ones.
In the introduction of this section, we made a distinction between ‘technical- 
professional’ and ‘social-cultural’ dimensions of the human knowledge in general and 
of the knowledge and organisation transfer in particular. (Instead of this distinction, 
several scholars suggest distinguishing between ‘technical practices’ - e.g., techniques, 
systems and various methods - ‘social-practices’ - e.g., sets of values, ideas on the 
nature of managerial or economic behaviour - (Soulsby - Clark, 1996.) In 
distinguishing between these two important dimensions o f managerial knowledge 
(skill) and organisation transfer, we had the following assumption: in foreign owned 
firms (especially in the form  o f  g reen fie ld  investment sites) the diffusion o f  the new 
(„ leading edge') managerial concepts and methods proceeded faster than at 
Hungarian-owned firms. The other sub-assumption is that the development o f  the 
‘technical-professional’ skill is faster than the 'social-cultural' one. However, the 
tatter in the nature o f  managerial skill has not unfavourable impact - at least not in the 
short run - on the performance o f  the firm.
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To test these assumptions we intend to use both the results of case studies made 
in the joint-ventures at the beginning of 1990’s and the experiences of a recent survey 
carried out in a region (1996) where the concentration of the FDI is extremely high and 
the industrial growth several times higher than the national rate. In order to present 
contrasting patterns in the managerial learning process, we compared joint-ventures 
having foreign owners versus Hungarian majority owners. Beyond this distinction 
made between foreign versus Hungarian owned privatised firms, it is advisable to 
distinguish between the so-called ‘green-field’ sites and ‘brown-field’ sites. In the 
second case, both foreign or Hungarian owners have to cope with the institutional 
legacy of the past (e.g., patterns of skill hiding, old working habits, the presence of 
n ade unions, etc.) In the case of the ‘green-field’ sites, management has more freedom 
to shape the present and future pattern of social relations o f the firms (e.g., preferring 
Works Council instead of trade unions, implementing the practice of labour market 
flexibility instead functional flexibility, etc.) The ‘green-field’ pattern of investment is 
a favoured path o f the firm ’s development choosing by such the MNCs as IBM, Ford, 
Suzuki, TDK, Sony, etc.
4
Independently from the types o f manufacturing sites (e.g., either green-field or 
brown-field), the core aims of the joint-venture firm’s management is to produce as 
fast as possible world-standard products and services in the post-socialist firms. 
According to the experiences o f the case studies carried out in these firms, the best 
results of knowledge and organisational transfer could be obtained by the combination 
of local and international experiences, (When we are using the term ‘international 
knowledge’, our intention is to refer the skill of managers who have significant 
international experiences. Since 1980’s, in the publications o f management consulting 
firms, the term of „Euro manager” has often been used to symbolise the owners o f this 
type of knowldege.)
Evaluating the empirical experiences o f transferring managerial skill and 
organisation in the practice of MNCs, we may say that they are the key carriers of the
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convergence of managerial methods and organisation. „Their cross-border organisation 
by definition implies transfer of knowledge and mediods. In addition, innovation may 
spread to domestic countries through a demonstration effect. The adaptation of local 
subsidiaries to coiporate standard is fostered by the control structures in place in 
multinational companies” . (Flecker, 1994: 98) Making a distinction between the tools 
of, convergence and divergence in transferring managerial skill and organisation, we 
may distinguish the following factors:
Factors of convergence:
a) transfer o f concepts, patterns of work-organisation,
managerial techniques,
b) forms of control, reporting, monitoring systems
Factors of divergence:
a) legacy of values and patterns o f behaviours in the managerial
working practice,
b) national patterns of employment relations system,
Besides the above-mentioned factors of convergence and divergence, it is 
necessary to deal with the important but often under-evaluated role of language. 
Before presenting some empirical experience learned from the case studies, it is worth 
mentioning that - in opposition to the widely shared opposing belief - the foreign 
investors are in general aware of the importance of local knowledge and experiences of 
their operations in the post-socialist countries of CEE. It is not by chance that the 
managerial roles requiring complex local social-cultural skills are filled by local 
(native) managers. For instance in the majority of cases, managers responsible for 
organising production and human resources are filled by local managers. Even in the 
case of the former GDR, where the institutions and market economy consistent 
knowledge were implemented in the highest speed and with the suppoit o f the largest 
financial resources to restructure former socialist economy. In this restructuring 
process, the West German managers took the responsibility of functions such as
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marketing, sales, etc., but production and personnel-related activities were controlled 
by the former East German managers. As one French social scientists dealing with the 
various aspects o f the ‘unification’ process noticed: „Dans les entreprises reprises par 
des investisseurs occidentaux - a plus de 90 pour cent ouest-allemand - les fonction de 
direction des ventes, du commerce et du marketing ont ete assurees par des personnels 
venus de l’Ouest. En revanche, les posies lies a la production et an personnel ont ete 
occupes par des individus de I ’Est. ” (Bafoil, 1996: 168.) Changes earned out in the 
sector of production and its social-organisational relations require more 'social- 
cultural’ experiences and these types of skills in general are underestimated during the 
re-snncturing process o f the former socialist economies. (Dittrich-Mako-Novoszath- 
Rudolf, 1995.)
4.4.2.1. The Case of the Austro-Hungarian Cold-Rolling Mill: How to Fit New 
Management Approaches with the Old Ones
The Hungarian owners o f the Austro-Hungarian Cold Rolling Mill Co. Ltd. (in 
hereinafter referred to as ‘the A-H Co. Ltd.) which is the largest Hungarian Steel 
Holding Co., employs more than 10.000 people and located in a ‘company tow n’ in 
Central Hungary comprising a vast, vertically integrated holding structure, parts of 
which have already been successfully privatised. The results o f the partial privatisation 
has produced a ‘recombined’ ownership structure of the state and private ownership. 
Recently, the Holding Co.’s management won the chance from the State Privatisation 
and Holding Company (APV Rt.) for ownership management, too. This is one of the 
most important management buyouts (MBO) ever realised in the country. The 
company’s management has to practice the ownership rights in market terms.
The ‘A-H Co. Ltd.’ represents a joint-venture with an Austrian Steel Company 
and was established in 1992. The company employs 740 people and produces 10 
billion Hungarian Forint turnover. As concerning the ownership structure, 67 per cent 
are owned by the Hungarian Steel Holding Co. and 33 per cent by the Austrian Steel 
company.(Fiiredi, 1994.) Among the first changes initiated by the new management of
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the ‘A-H Co. Ltd.’ we have to mention die implementation of die cost-responsibility 
system (CRS) and the new work-organisation introduced in the maintenance activity.
Following the establishment of the ‘H-A Co. Ltd.’, new management was 
composed of the following structure: Austrians took the functions o f director, 
marketing, sale, storage and controlling, Hungarians became responsible for 
production, finance and human resource management. Cost-planning and control, 
especially the form of CRS in the former ( ‘socialist’) firm practice was 
underdeveloped due to the ‘soft-budget constraint’ o f the state, who was the exclusive 
owner of the steel company, including the ‘cold rolling m ill’. Both the Austrian and 
Hungarian managers o f the joint-venture were aware o f this weakness o f managing 
economic activity. One of die first changes mitiated by the new management was the 
creation of marketing and sales functions, implementation of the cost responsibility 
system (CRS) and the transfer o f the new approach in maintenance activity from the 
Austrian owner’s similar plant. There we intend to deal with the difficulties in 
transferring the new CRS and maintenance work-orgamsation from the Austrian into 
the Hungarian practice.
The logic o f  the CRS system is to synchronise the production and cashflow  in 
the various production cycles in the company. In this system, everybody is to be 
responsible for its designated cost-place, which includes participation in cost-place 
calculation, planning and control. The time space for cost-control is one month and the 
‘controllers’ from time to time are checking the relation between the planned and the 
actual level of costs and register the discrepancies for each product cycle. Owning this 
knowledge, the ‘controllers’ are able to suggest to the management the necessary cost- 
adjustment measures. Using this method of CRS, the management of the joint-venture 
could avoid the worst surprise at the end of the fiscal year: financial crisis. During the 
implementation of the CRS, the Austrian chief controller - who was responsible for the 
smooth operation of this system - confronted numerous difficulties, from terminology 
to the legacy of the over-centralised and specialised management system of the state- 
owned ( ‘socialist’) company. Surprisingly enough, against the expectation of the
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Hungarian managers and professionals, the difficulties o f the implementation of CRS 
techniques were not related to the lack of the ‘computerised management information 
system’ (CM1S) or to other problems of infrastructure supporting management. Instead 
die Austrian chief controller often complained on the terminology problems and the 
over-centralised and specialised nature o f the management and information system 
where the members o f organisation are lacking the global view and the autonomy of 
action in the organisation. The following scripts from the interviews made with the 
Austrian chief controller illustrate well the above described difficulties of this new 
concept of financial management (CRS) within the new joint-venture: ,,The efficiency 
of the new CRS does not depend - as several Hungarian colleagues anticipated - on the 
level of technical infrastructure. But I have serious problems related to the use o f  
terminology. For instance, we - Austrians and Hungarians - are using the same notion, 
but its meaning is different. Therefore if I want to realise the ideal CRS designed by 
myself, I have to revise it, again and again. The categories used in my previous 
experiences cannot be used here without modifications. From the mechanical use of 
categories significant misunderstandings arise. Sometimes, I feel that these 
misunderstandings are irreconcilable. Our way o f  thinking is d ifferen t...”
Looking for sources explaining this ‘different way of thinking’ between native 
and foreign staff members, we may discover significant differences in the managerial 
learning process o f the managers concerned. The smooth operation of CRS needs 
strong and visible individual cost-responsibility consciousness which is supported by 
the decentralised decision making system (this is the source of the autonomy necessary 
for taking responsibility) and open information system, in practice, there is an essential 
gap between the desired individual cost-responsibility and the necessary degree of 
decentralisation of decision which is the core component o f the individual 
responsibility for the cost formation. Without the necessary decentralisation 
(delegation) of decisions, the person responsible for cost-saving lacks both the 
necessary information and the discretion to bear responsibility for his cost-place. This 
system itself conditions refusal of individual responsibility and re-produces the well 
known organisational syndrome of the socialist political and economic regime: refusal
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of individual responsibility and relying on ‘collective irresponsibility’. The Austrian 
manager responsible for ‘controlling’ made a correct diagnosis on the roots o f tins 
attitude of ‘responsibility refusal’ experienced among the Hungarian employees in 
relation with CRS: „ ... avoiding the responsibility fo r  cost-jbrmalion conditioned by 
the existing leadership style ... this is the heritage o f  the past: the majority o f  people 
cannot or do not want to take responsibility, or do not want to work autonomously. In 
the past, written instructions dominated and people tried to fulfil tasks prescribed by 
instructions. This system was very comfortable, but very inefficient ... Top 
management concentrates decisions and do not delegate them to the lower 
hierarchical levels. Top managers are responsible for everything. For instance, when 
somebody wants to order the necessary material he or she cannot sign the documents, 
even those representing very small value. Only top managers can sign it; these are very 
stupid things. Within these circumstances, people rightly protest and they ask: why am 
I responsible for this cost accounting? This creates an ambivalent behaviour. From the 
top management side, they do not want to change the decision making system, and 
therefore on the bottom-line, employees say: I cannot do anything. There is a proverb 
here; an employee has such quantity o f rights, what he or she secured through 
fighting.” (The Austrian chief controller)
The difficulties in transferring participation based or decentralised management 
system (e.g., financial control system) are not limited only to Hungarian organisational 
culture. (Mako - Dittrich - Stojanov, 1996.) Similar patterns o f behaviour were 
identified by the well-known French multinational firms' operations (e.g., Lafarge, 
Danone, etc.) in other CEE countries. For instance the Lafarge top manager 
responsible for the ‘conversion’ o f the former East-German and Polish work-force to 
the requirements of the market economy in its recently purchased plants in these 
countries was confronted also with the above presented difficulties in introducing new 
operation management methods and organisation consistent with the requirements of 
the market economy (e.g., cost efficiency, quality, customer orientation). However, it 
is interesting to note that the French managers did not confront noticeable problems 
during the course of training and re-training both East-German and Polish work-force:
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the introduction of module-type training did not meet resistance of the rank-and-file 
employees. But, on the other hand, significant problems were raised during 
implementation o f  the „ participative" management. French top manager commented 
on difficulties met in the Polish plant, during an interview given to the ‘Le M onde’: 
la dynamique de management participative que nous appliquons n ’est pas facile a 
faire passer. Le blocage est simple a comprendre; les Polonais etaient habitues 
jusqu’ici a executer sans critiquer ou meme dormer leurs avis ...” (Piot, 1996: 11)
* An important organisational transfer was carried out in the production sector o f the 
Austro-Hungarian joint-venture: a new maintenance concept and work-organisatwn 
were implemented from the Austrian mother company to its Hungarian subsidiary 
plant. In order to understand the rationality of the new maintenance concept, it is 
necessary to describe the logic of the old one, which represented a generally used 
maintenance approach in the industrial practice of the former socialist countries of 
CEE. The old maintenance concept was called ‘Planned Preventive M aintenance’ 
(PPM) and according to its logic, after certain period of time, the parts or spare parts of 
the equipment were changed following the instruction of the maintenance manual, 
independently of the technical condition of these parts. This method of equipment 
maintenance was costly, has produced permanently high work-load (and bargaining 
power) for the maintenance workers and periodically significant losses for the 
production personnel because of the work stoppages during significant maintenance. 
The core logic of the new maintenance concept is that the maintenance section can 
periodically make equipment diagnostic and let the sub-equipment or spare-parts 
function until the anticipated serviceable technical limit. Before the introduction of the 
new concept of maintenance, both Hungarian top and middle managers had a chance to 
know in operation of the new system using the possibilities to visit the Austrian plant, 
where the new system was in service. It seemed that the Hungarian managers fully 
understood and welcomed the new maintenance concept, they were convinced by the 
advantages, especially in the long-run efficiency of the new concept over the old one. 
The management did not meet any difficulties related to the ‘cognitive’ aspect o f the 
planned transfer of new maintenance approach. However, at the lower-level, the ‘re-
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labelling’ of the existing job-title’ in relation to the re-organisation of the maintenance 
work provoked an unexpected resistance both in the group of supervisors and the 
workers. This resistance could be explained, at first glance, by the differences between 
the Austrian and Hungarian terminology differences: in the maintenance practice of the 
Austrian company, instead of supervisor of maintenance, the title o f ‘M aster’ of 
maintenance was used and accepted without doubles in the Austrian context. But in 
the Hungarian shop-floor society, for both supervisors who are representing the social- 
professional group of first-line managers and rank-and-file employees, the ‘Master' 
title reflects lower social-status and shrinks the ‘space’ of organisational career for the 
blue-collar workers. To overcome the resistance of the Hungarian supervisors against 
the new-work organisation in the maintenance section, the Hungarian and Austrian 
managers modified the label o f the criticised job title and called them ‘area- 
technicians’ instead of ‘M aster’. The head of the Hungarian maintenance section 
described the situation in the following way; „In the Hungarian shop-floor culture, the 
‘master’ job has a different social and cultural sense compared with the Austrian 
factory. There, the ‘m aster’ carries out some kind of supervisory (managerial) tasks, 
too. But in the Hungarian context of the maintenance section, ‘master’ belongs to the 
social-occupational category of the highly skilled blue collar workers, without having 
any officially recognised supervisory obligations and prerogatives. As a result of 
compromise, instead of the ‘master’ or ‘area-master’ the former ‘supervisors’ became 
‘area-teclinicians’ ... the invention of the title of ‘area-technicians’ was the result of 
common efforts o f Austrian and Hungarian managers.”
It is necessaiy to call attention to the fact that the centre of debate was not the 
terminology or title differences, but the fear of the Hungarian blue-collar workers and 
supervisors of the shrinking mobility chances in the Hungarian plant. Introduction of 
the ‘Master’ title has the following message for the Hungarians concerned: they have 
no chance to leave the ‘social-occupational’ categoiy of blue-collar workers, no 
possibility to became managers - even at lower-level - in the joint-venture. The only 
remaining chance for the rank-and-file employees is to move up on the scale of 
qualification and the top of this scale is represented by the Master-category. This
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explains why middle managers and blue-collar workers created a coalition of interests 
to support supervisors o f the maintenance section to refuse the introduction of the 
‘Master’ title. Summing up, the key motivation o f  resistance related not at all to the 
'terminologyy' or ‘cultural’ differences hut to the possibility o f the narrowing 
organisational promotion created by the implementation o f  the new-work organisation 
in the maintenance activity o f  the Hungarian subsidiary.
4.2.2.Combination o f Local and International Experiences: the Case of a
M NC O perating in the Electric and Electronic Industrial Sector
A well-known multinational corporation started its activity in Hungary as early 
as 1970’s, having minority ownership in the Hungarian electronic firms. (It is worth to 
note that this MNC with German headquarters was extremely well-known in the 
Hungarian market before World War II). As a result of its cumulative development - 
which was sped up by the collapse of COMECON, the key market for the Hungarian 
electronic industry. Nowadays the Hungarian subsidiary has recently received full 
autonomy within the global network of the company.
During the first years of the joint-ventures - in which the German company 
became the majority owner during the middle of 1990’s - one of the most visible 
difficulties in transferring managerial skill and organisation was language, especially at 
the beginning. As one Hungarian top manger noticed; ‘One o f  the most essential 
source o f  communication disturbance was the language. At the beginning the 
management intended to keep German-speaking (native) persons in the managerial 
positions, but this attempt failed ...” The language related problems are producing 
headaches not only for the local managers of the ‘receiver’ country, but also for the 
‘international’ managers who are the subjects of the transfer policy of the MNCs. [2] 
For example, according to the latest experiences of European manager’s transfer, the 
language difficulties ranked on third position of the problems, following the main 
concern of children’s education and the ‘dual-career family’. See in detail table 22:
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Table 22 Constraints on Transfer o f Managers: Rankins* of Problem Factors
Problem factors 1996 1995 1994 1993
Children’ education 1 2 2 !
Dual career families 2 1 1 2
Language difficulties J *■>J j -i_J  —
Quality o f  life 4 4 4 J  —
Source; MONKS Partnership Briefing, Issue Sixteen, August 1996., p. 27.
It seems as though as time passes, the language difficulties and the supporting 
roles of the international managers are decreasing. In the multinational electronic fiim 
( 'E ’ MNC), in spite o f the majority foreign (German) ownership, Hungarian and 
German managers have well-balanced status. This equal status-based management 
system reflects well the positive outcome of the ‘mutual-leaming process’ during 
transferring managerial skill and organisation. The participants o f the managerial 
learning process are well aware o f the importance of the knowledge and experiences 
accumulated both in the Hungarian and the international practices. The following, 
relatively long passage quoted from the interview conducted with a Hungarian director 
illustrates well the ‘collective’ and ‘interactive’ character o f the knowledge creation 
and use: „ ... we tried to use firstly our own personnel in production because of an 
important tradition and experiences in assembly-type work m Hungary. When we 
needed strong professional support, we invited experts from the German mother 
company. They assisted in various kinds of ‘Product and Service Exhibition’ organised 
for our potential customers with the ambition to improve our marketing and sale 
related skill. In this way, we tried to combine the knowledge o f  mother's company 
experts and our local experiences accumulated with (he Hungarian clients. This 
approach adopted by the management did help us to overcome the difficulties of 
starting years of joint-venture. Later, we used the method ‘on the job training’ (OJT) to 
overcome our shortcomings in organising and managing people (e.g., team-working,
- method of parallel working practice) and our colleagues have spent one or two months
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working in the same field at the mother-company. In this way, our employees fried to 
pick up as fast as possible the most important elements of the necessary skill. 
Nowadays, our engineers are working together with the engineers of the mother- 
company in South Africa, in South Korea etc."
The other extremely interesting method used to speed up the underdeveloped 
cost sensibility of the Hungarian managers - as we already have mentioned in the case 
of the A-H Co. Ltd. in the previous section - was the implementation of the so-called 
'four-eyes approach'. According to this working method, the sale-engineer is working 
in a team with the financial specialist. As derives from its function, the sale-engineer is 
motivated to increase the turnover of the company, the key interest o f the financial- 
specialist is to control the profitability of the firm. The logic o f team-work means that 
the final decision on the planned transaction could be made only in the case of 
convergent opinion of sales-engineer and fmancial-specialist. To avoid any unequal 
relations in power between the two partners in co-decision, their performance 
evaluation does not depend on the same boss. Due to the lack of dependent relations, 
the ‘fmancial-specialist’ (in German: ‘Kaufman’) could represent his cost-efficiency 
driven position in front o f  the sales-engineer. Within the organisational context of the 
‘separated dependence’ relations, the sales-engineers and the fmancial-specialist are 
working in team and co-operating in making sale’ related transactions without 
particular difficulties.
Summing up the experiences in transferring managerial skill and organisations 
using the briefly presented cases, we have to call attention at least to two lessons. 
Firstly, the desired changes in the practice of skill use and the organisational-social 
relations desired postulate a time-space pre-condition. It is well-known among the 
experts of organisation design and changes, that a new and well functioning system 
needs at least 6-7 year ‘learning-process’. Like other kinds of innovations, the new 
combination of skill and organisation of economic activity involves continuous 
changes not only in the work-practices but also in the patterns of behaviour o f the 
actors concerned. Secondly, the other precondition for the successful transfer of
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managerial skill and organisation is the mulual-adaptation (or interactive learning) o f  
the actors having international and local knowledge and practices. The recognition of 
importance of the mutual-learning or learning from each other is well reflected in the 
following remark of a foreign financial controller, after several years of service spent 
in joint-venture firm in Hungary: „The foreign manager cannot come here with the 
ambition to change everything and very fast. In that case he will probably fail. It is not 
necessaiy to change everything, because it is almost impossible to transfer exactly the 
same categories, practices. It could be that something is working well in the Austrian 
context, but it does not work in Hungary. He has to know what is possible to change 
here, and in which cases he or she has to avoid any changes, plus what amount of time 
is needed for the desired changes. The foreign manager could be successful, if he 
adapts to the existing local institutions and he is well aware of these circumstances 
before his assignment into another country. The working conditions are veiy different 
here, and within these circumstances he or she can or cannot perform the job 
assigned.,,
After presenting the roles of western consulting firms and the experiences of 
joint-ventures in transferring market standard managerial skill and organisation from 
matured market economy into the post-socialist countries of CEE - focusing mainly to 
the Hungarian experiences - we try to demonstrate the results of the managerial and 
organisational learning process. Naturally, it is extremely difficult to find any global 
indicator reflecting the complexity of this performance. In spite o f these difficulties, 
the next chapter tries to evaluate the development of the transformation process using 
variety of indicators reflecting the efficiency of diffusion of the market institutions 
(privatisation schemes) and managerial skill and organisation necessitated within the 
new circumstances in the CEE region. Particular attention will be paid to the relation 
between owners and managers as well as to the special role of ‘green-field’ investment 
in modernising managerial methods and practice.
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Notes
[ 1] The Hokkaido Project was initiated by Professor Rihito Yamamura, Hokkaido 
University, Slavik Research Centre, in co-operation with Professor-Akihiro lshikawa, 
Chuo University, Institute for Social Sciences, Tokyo and the survey was conducted in 
Spring 1996, at the machine industry sector. The sample includes 35 firms in Hungary, 
30 firms in Czech Republic and Poland and 24 firms m Slovakia. The firms surveyed 
have at least 500 employees. In order to create a statistically representative sample, the 
fnms participating in the survey were located at least three or four different economic 
zones (e.g. ‘strong’ and ‘weak” regions) in each country. The so-called structured 
interviews were conducted by professional researcher themselves and graduate 
students from the Budapest University o f Economic Sciences, Department of 
Management and Organisation. The Hungarian research (national) team was co­
ordinated by Csaba Mako, scientific advisor at the Centre for Social Conflict Research 
HAS and professor at the Department of Management and Organisation at the 
Budapest University o f Economic Sciences. Using the same research method, at the 
spring of 1997, the textile and clothing industry will be surveyed by the Hokkaido 
Project Team.
[2] In relation with the company policies for assistmg the executive and family transfer 
from one country in Europe to another varies with the type of transfer undertaken. 
MONKS Partnership Ltd. consulting group classifies moves into the following three 
categories:
„Short Term Move” : This type of transfer is typically for up to one year. The objective 
may be the transfer o f specific skills or experiences to a different location or the 
development of a new business area.
„Career Move” : A career move will often be a period of between two and four years. 
The transfer will take up a specific role in the host country and become a temporary 
member of the management team. It is recognised that the move will widen the 
individual’s experience and enhance his or her worth to the organisation. It is also 
recognised that at the end of the assignment, the transferee will either move on to 
another country or return to the home base.
„Permanent” : The individual is transferred without time limit, apart from retirement. 
There is normally no automatic right to return to home base. The executive will be 
considered to be a permanent member of the local work-force or management team, 
(in) MONKS Partnership: Briefing, Issue Sixteen, August, 1996. P. 24.
101
References
Arva, L. ( 1994) Direct Foreign Investment: Some Theoretical and Practical Issues, 
Budapest: National Bank of Hungary
Baugert, D. Poor, J. (1993) ‘Foreign involvement in the Hungarian Economy: Its
Impact on Human Resource Management, The International Journal o f Human 
Resource Management, 4/!: pp. 817-840.
Bafoil, F. (1996) ‘Les apprentissages de la transition dans [’enterprise est-allemande,
Sociologie du Travail, No.e. pp. 163-178.
The Business Central Europe, (1996) Foreign Investment Survey, April, pp. 39-42.
Dittrich, E.-Mako, Cs.-Novoszath, P. - Rudolf, F. (1995) ‘Corporate Culture in
Transition to the Market Economy’, (In the Case of Joint-Ventures in Hungary, 
Poland and Bulgaria), Budapest: Centre fo r  Social Conflict Research HAS - 
Bielefeld: University o f  Bielefeld, Faculty o f  Sociology, pp.64.
Child, J. Markoczy, L. (1993) ‘Host-country managerial behaviour and learning in
Chinese and Hungarian Joint-Ventures’, Journal o f  Management Studies, 30/4: 
pp. 611-631.
Csefalvay, Z. (1993) ‘Felharmadolt orszag’ (Magyarorszag teruleti atrendezodese) (A 
couruy divided into three parts. Regional re-structuring of Hungary), Budapest: 
Natiocfol Bank o f  Hungary
Ellingstad, M. (1996.a.) ‘The Maquilladora Syndrome: Central European Prospects’, 
Europe - Asia Studies, January, 1997.
Ellingstad, M. (1996.b.) 'Hungarian Industrial Relations in Transition’ (Air
Examination of Green-field Investment and Privatisation on Labour), Szeged: 
Department o f  Sociology - Madison: La Follette Institute - University o f  
Wisconsin
Flecker, J. (1994) ‘Convergence of work organisation in an international economy’,
(in) Mako, Cs. - Novoszath, P. (eds.) Covergence versus D ivergence: the case 
o f the Corporate Culture, Budapest: Com and Con Co. Ltd. - Institute for Social 
Conflict Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, pp. 91-112.
102
Fiiredi, G. (1994) ‘New Requirements for the Human Resource Management in the
Joint-Venture Firms’, (in) MaJko, Cs. - Novoszath, P. (eds.) Convergence versus 
Divergence: the Case o f  the Corporate Culture, Budapest: Com and Con Co. 
Ltd. - Institute for Social Conflict Research, HAS, pp. 113-123.
Francis, W. (1996) ‘E - Europe investment grows strongly’, Financial Times, July 17.
P. 4.
Hamori, Sz. (1996) Tovabb csokken a foglalkoztatas’, (Employment further declines), 
Nepszabadsdg, December 10. P. I and 10.
Hovanyi, G. (1994) ‘Investigating the Efficiency of West-European Consulting firms 
Working for East-Europen Companies’, Award from  AC ACE 1992 Program, 
Pecs: Department of Industrial Economic Studies
Grabher, G. - Stark, D. (1996) ‘A szervezett sokfeleseg - evolucio elmelet, 
halozatelemzes es a posztszocilista atalakulas’,(Organised Diversity - 
Evolutionary Theory - Network-Analysis and the Post-Socialist 
Transformation), Kozgazdasagi Szemle, (Economic Review),
XLIII.evf Szeptember, pp.745-769.
Ishikawa, A. (1992) ‘Patterns of Work Identity in the Firms and the Plant: An East- 
West Comparison,’, (in) Szell, Gy. (ed.) Labour Relations in Transition in 
Eastern Europe,Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 85-92.
Ken, G. (1996) ‘Multinacionalis leanyvallalatok szervezeti kulturaja Magyarorszagon, 
megalakulasuktol napjamkig: General Electric-Tungsram, Philips 
Magyarorszag, Procter & Gamble Hungary, Budapest: Budapest University o f  
Economic Sciences - Department o f  Management and Organisation - Diploma, 
June.
Komai, J. (1996) ‘Kiigazitas recesszio nelkiil’, (Correction without Recession),
Kozgazdasagi Szemle, (Economic Review), XLIII evf. Julius Augusztus, pp. 
585-613.
Karoliny Martonne, Dr. Csetneki Zsuzsanna (1996) Az ember - mint specialis
szervezeti eroforras - menedzselese (Managing human as special organisational 
resource), Pecs: Janus Pannomus University, Ph. D. Dissertation
Kasahaia, K. - Mako, Cs. (1996) Manpower and Skill Use in the Transformation 
Process, (The Case o f  the Post-Socialist Firsm), Tokyo: Rikkyo University - 
Budapest: Institute for Social Conflict Research HAS
103
Lee, S. (1996) ‘Videoton’s Restructuring’ Political Pay-Offs’, Business Central 
Europe, July, pp. 30-3 I.
Mako, Cs. - Dittrich, E. - Ch. Stojanov (1996) ‘Untemehmenskultur, Nationialkultur 
und Transfoirnation’ (in) Land, R. (ed.) Wandel von Unternehmenskulturen in 
Osideutschland and Osieuropa, Miinchen und Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 
pp. 73-90.
Markoczy, L. (1996) ‘Are Cultural Differences O v e r ra te d ? Financial Times, July 26., 
p. 10.
Maximov, B. (1996) ‘Alienation and Self-Alienation from Participation’, Paper
presented to the Workshop of RC 10 of ISA: Theoretical Approaches towards 
Democracy in Organisations, 11-14 July, Copenhagen - Denmark
MONKS Partnership: Briefmg, Issue Sixteen, August, 1996.
MONKS Partnership: Management Moves: a Guide to Transfer Policies in Major 
Multinationals, June, 1996.
Marsh, P. (1996) ‘Car Components: Germany lags UK and Japan in quality’, The 
Financial Times, November 7.
Nepszabadsag (1996) ‘A kiilfoldi toke fele az allame lett’, (50 per cent of foreign 
capital is a state money), November 6 ., p. 1 and 10.
Piot, O. (1996) ‘Un specialiste du developpement a l ’Est’, (Lafarge sur la site polonais
de Kujawy), Le Monde, 21 May, p. 11.
Polanyi, M. (1967) The Tacit Dimension, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Polkiyi, M. (1969) Knowing and Being, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Polanyi, M. (\994) Szemelyes tudas, I  II. (Personal Knowledge), Budapest: Atlantisz
104
Spat, J. (1996) ‘Egy segelyprogram megvalositasanak folyamata: a PHARE Program 
szerepe a vallalkozasi kultura terjeszteseben, (Evaluation of a European Aid 
Program: PHARE Program’s Role in Creating Entrepreneurial Culture), 
Budapest: Budapest University o f  Economic Sciences - Department o f  
Management and Organisation, Diploma, July
Simon, L. - Davies, G. (1996) ‘A Contextual Approach to Management Learning: the 
Hungarian Case’, Organisational Studies, Vol. 17., Issue 2,. Pp. 269-289.
Soulsby, A. - Clark, E. (1996.a.) ‘The Emergence of Post-Communist Management in 
the Czech Republic’ Organisation Studies, Vol. 17. Issue 2. Pp. 227-247.
Soulsby, A. - Clark, E. (1996,b.) ‘The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the 
Czech-Republic, Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 48. No.2
Sti eeck, W. (1993) ‘The Rise and Decline of Neo-corporatism1, (in) Economic and  
Political Changes in Europe: Implications on Industrial Relations, Bari:
Cacucci Editore, pp. 27-62.
Taylor. R. (1996) ‘Benefits shrink for senior managers posted abroad’ Financial 
Times, 18 July, p .9.
Thornhill, J. (1996) ‘Russia’s unfinished revolution’, Financial Times, May 30., p. 17.
Yamamura, R. - Ishikawa, A. - Mako, Cs. - Ellingstad, M. (1996) ‘Business
Organisation m the Transformation Process in the Post-Socialist Countries’, 
Sapporo: Hokkaido University - Slavic Research Centre, (Manuscript - 
Confidential)
Williams, f. (1996) ‘Eastern Europe investment grows strongly’, Financial Times, July
17., p. 4.
Quentin, P. (1996) ‘Russia’s Market at cross-road’, Financial Times, July 6/7, p. 8.
105
5. Strategic Privatisation: Speed-up Re-organisation o f  Economic Activity 
and Managerial Learning Process
5.1. Privatisation: Creating Real Owners and M anagers
Several years have passed since the collapse o f the state-socialist political- 
economic regime, but until now we have rather few firm or ineso-level empirical 
studies on the impact o f privatisation and the transformation of the managerial labour 
process. According to the lessons learned from the previous chapters, the ownership 
(either state or private) matters not in itself but in the foims of investment in new 
technology and introducing new managerial concepts and methods (e.g., new HRM 
techniques, TQM, JIT etc.) Fortunately, recently several studies have been carried out 
on the changing governance and organisation structure in both post-privatised or newly 
created private firms m the post-socialist countries. (Child - Markoczy, 1993., Simon - 
Davies, 1996., Child-Czegledy, 1996., Adorjan-Balaton-Galgoczy-Mako-Temovszky,
1996., etc.) These interesting studies have no primarily ambition to compare the 
development of management and organisation at sector level among the CEE countries. 
The other wave of studies, dominating the scene of social debate in Hungary are 
dealing with management as a distinctive social-occupational group and its role in the 
emerging new political-economic elite. In the centre of this interest, among other 
things, is the degree of autonomy practised by the new owner vis-a-vis the 
management. One school o f thought, most commonly associated with the University of 
California’s Ivan Szelenyi, holds that firm-internal transformational processes are 
slowed (or at least not promoted) by top and middle-level managers, who maintain 
control over the everyday workings of the fum and who still operate, to some degree, 
according to non-market and often clanistic incentives which previously existed. 
(Szellenyi, 1996.) In response, Cornell’s David Stark has found that given the proper 
conditions, owners, not managers, hold the upper hand and they are indeed willing and 
capable o f intervention to protect their own interest. (Stark, 1996.) In the earlier 
chapter presented data of the 'Hokkaido Project’, carried out at the beginning of 1996
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in effect m inor not only this debate but inform us also on the uneven development of 
the relation between owners and managers as well as o f the managerial learning 
process, (Yamamura-Ishikawa-Mako-EUingstad, 1996.) First, by examining the 
relative decision making power of top managers compared to the owners, we see that 
owners are more powerful exactly where we expect: the appointment o f  managing 
director, capital investment and profit distribution.
However, in questions of reorganisation, the overwhelming balance of power 
falls to top management, which is, after all, chosen by owners. The rather large gulf in 
the reorganisation category does suggest that management enjoys considerable
flexibility in pursuing ownership’s strategic goals, as expressed through capital 
investment and the appointment of the managing director.
.An interesting contribution to the debate over the efficacy of coupon
privatisation can be observed with the results that show the Czech Republic, on 
average, as having the lowest gulf in influence distribution between top management 
and ownership. This seems to suggest that the huge investment funds in the Czech
Republic (and to a more limited extent, Slovakia) take a more active role in
management than has previously been ascribed to them. Poland, having the largest 
proportion of state-owned firms - in the machine industry firm ’s sample o f Hokkaido 
Project - predictably shows the largest gap between top managers and owners.
The differences between top and middle management are significantly larger in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia than in Hungary and Poland, suggesting that 
indirectly - through the appointment of top managers - Czech and Slovak owners have 
more influence over the internal workings of the firm.
The labour component offers some very interesting findings, with numerous 
consequences both for human resource management and the labour market as a whole. 
Given Poland’s recent history of comparatively higher str ike rates (See the section 4.3. 
evaluating the various patterns of labour relations), it should come as no surprise that
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Poland’s composite labour score is significantly above the other Visegrad countries. 
An interesting comparison can be made between Hungary, which has the lowest 
composite labour score, and Poland, as both countries have quite weak labour market - 
in comparison with the Czech Republic. Poland’s history of strikes and its relatively 
high score in these measures - at a time of historical labour weakness - might support 
the conclusion that in the longer-term, when the period of transition passes and labour 
markets are presumably tighter, patterns of industrial relations will likely be spicier in 
Poland than elsewhere in the CEE region.
Table 23 Bottom-up Communication Channel on Wane-Related Issues
Channels of 
communication
Poland Czech
Republic
Slovakia Hungary
Via Trade Union 77.6 % 46.7% 47.8 % 28.6 %
Via Works Council[+] 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 28.6 %
Via foreman or shop-floor 
chiefs
23.3 % 30.0 % 30.4 % 5.7 %
Via unofficial leaders 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 14.3 %
Duectly or individually 
by workers
0.0 % 20.0 % 13.0% 11.4%
Other 0.0 % 3.3 % 8.7 % 1 1 . 4 %
Note: Among the Visegrad countries, only the Hungarian Industria Relations has the institution of
Works Council for the employee participation. 
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996.
Table 23 shows how Poland reflects its history of trade union activism 
compared to the more indirect and subtle labour relations system which have arisen in 
the other Visegrad countries, especially in Hungary. In this country, the examination of 
the bottom-up communication channel on wage related issues shows the great variety 
in patterns of communication channels, and the significant role o f ‘informality’ in the 
social relation of the firm.
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5.2. Variety in Forms o f Privatisation Facilitates the Diffusion of New 
Managerial Techniques and Organisations. Green-Field Sites as the 
Vehicles of the ‘Leading-Edge” Methods of M anagem ent
The results of the extensive privatisation programs in the CEE region over the 
past seven years are evident. According to the latest report o f the World Bank, the 
private ownership is dominant both in the share of employment and in GDP in the 
post-socialist countries o f CEE. (Borish-Noel, 1996: 87.)
In examining the results o f privatisation at sector-level (e.g., machine industry)
we may discover noticeable variety in foims of the ownership. For Hungary, only 14.3
per cent of firms sampled are classified as a state-owned joint-stock company (i.e., the
stocks are majonty-owned by a state holding company), with no firms being classified
as traditional state enterprise. (See Table 24)
Table 24 Types and Legal Form of Enterprise
(Sample of machine industrial firms)
Forms of Ownership Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary
1. State enterprise 26.7 % 3.3 % 4.2 % 0.0 %
2.Former state enterprise
a. State-owned joint stock co. 36.7 % 3.3 % 12.5 % 14.3 %
b. Privatised joint stock co. 30.0 % 70.0% 58.3 % 22.9 %
c. Limited liability co. 6.7 % 3.3 % 0.0 % 20.0 %
3. New private enterprise
a. Joint stock co. 0.0 % 3.3 % 4.2 % 2.9 %
b. Limited liability co. 0.0 % 3.3. % 0.0 % 0.0 %
4. Joint venture 0.0 % 3.3 % 8.3 % 20.0 %
Oilier 0.0 % 10.0 % 8.3 % 20.0 %
No answer 0.0 % 0.0 % 4.2 % 0.0 %
Source: The Hokkaido Project. 1996.
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A rather small percentage - 2.9 % in the case of Hungaiy - o f firms are newly 
created "green-field’ sites. Green-field sites, which have attracted increasing attention 
as the CEE countries become an increasingly attractive location for exporting into the 
EU, are likely underrepresented precisely because they are new. (Note: in the latter 
part of this chapter we shall present a table on the diffusion of ‘leading-edge’ 
management methods from a region, where ‘green-field’ sites have higher 
concentration rate than national.)
In relation to the privatisation process it is worth mentioning the variety of 
approaches adopted by the former socialist countries. As Ellingstad (1996.b. 48) 
noticed; „After initially utilising spontaneous” pnvatisation, Hungaiy has used the so- 
called strateg ic” privatisation method, whereby the willingness and capacity to invest 
in the privatised company is often given as much weight as the actual bid price. This 
approach tend to favour larger (mainly foreign) investors as opposed, for example, 
Czech coupon privatisation, which concentrates control in the hands of banks and 
investment funds often via domestic investors. As such post-privatised companies in 
Hungary generally offer a more visible contrast to their predecessors than for instance 
in the Czech Republic, where the picture is more blurry because of slower, more 
convulated changes in management structure.”
It is not surprising, therefore, that Komai in his recent (1996) analysis of the 
economic restructuring process in the CEE countries and Russia explains the 
impressive labour productivity development in Hungaiy - among other factors (i.e., 
severe budget constraints, no more ‘unemployment’ within factory gate) - by the 
impact o f privatisation schemes which did create ‘real owners’ pushing managers to 
initiate and cany out deep restructuring in their firms and are creating strong profit 
motivation within management. See Table 25 for figures regarding labour productivity 
development.
Table 25 Labour Productivity in the Visegrad countries
Country Average Labour Productivity (Real GDP/employment, 1989=1)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Poland 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.98 LOO 1.07
Czech
Republic.
1.00 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.91
Slovakia LOO 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.96
Hungaiy LOO 0.98 0.92 1.05 1.11 1.16
Source: Komai, J. (1996) 'Kiigazitas recesszio nelkul' (Correction without Recession), Kozgazdasagi 
Szemle. (Economic Review), XLIII.evf. Julius-Augusztus. p 609.
In explaining the better productivity figures in Hungary, it is necessary to 
emphasise the ‘core’ roles o f the ‘green-field1 sites o f multinational corporations 
facilitated by the large foreign direct investments. These new manufacturing sites 
speed-up the introduction of both new technologies and ‘leading-edge’ managerial 
methods and practices. Such well-known high-precision manufacturing firms as GM, 
Audi, Ford, IBM, Matsushita, Philips, Samsung, etc., were attracted to Hungary - and 
also in the other Visegrad countries - not merely by the low-wages but by the 
combination of low-wage rate and a relatively highly skilled work-force together with 
the relatively developed infrastructure. In the globalised manufacturing environment 
today, quality, productivity and market opportunities are at least as important as low- 
wages. However, it is necessary to stress the str ong role of wage competition among 
the former socialist-countries. For example, in the special number of the ‘Economist’ 
dealing with the tendency of 1997’s, we could read about the signs that western 
companies already have discovered that the Ukrainian labour at a cost o f USD 40 a 
month irresistibly attractive compared with Czech at USD 400 - in comparison with 
German at USD 4,000 a month. (Lacas, 1996:42)
In the weak labour market context in Hungaiy, MNCs or foreign owned firms in 
general pay 20 - 30 % above average wages to the blue-collar workers to keep skilled 
employees. In the case o f professionals and managers the gap between the Hungarian 
wages and Western European is much more moderate.
To get a deeper insight into the managerial and organisational learning process 
which is the combination of spaces for transferring managerial skill and organisation 
from Western Europe into the post-socialist countries of CEE, it is necessaiy to focus 
again our attention on the sector or firm-level changes. Within the framework of the 
often quoted ‘Hokkaido Project’, the top managers (chief executives) o f the post­
privatised firms operating in machine industry, were asked to rank measures aimed at 
improving the economic position of the company. The list o f measures (20 factors) 
was divided into the following two categories:
a) ‘Firm internal transformation ’ indicator (e.g. accelerating privatisation, reduction of 
personnel, replacement of top-managers, separation of section from the mother 
company, setting-up profit centre from branches or sections, merger with other 
companies, diversification of business, reorganisation of production process, 
improvement of financial management, establishment o f joint-ventures.)
b) Firm external drive ' mdicator (e.g. reinforcement of marketing activities, change 
customers, change of suppliers, reinforcement of non-productive activities, dropping 
non-profitable products, R & D for new products, increasing exports, becoming sub­
contractor of foreign partner)
Table 26 Measures taken for Survival and Development of the Firm
Indicator Hungary Czech Republic Poland Slovakia
a) "Firm internal transformation' 36.7 % 56.9 % 63.3 % 56.0 %
b) 'Firm external drive' 43.3 % 43.3 % 36.9 % 41 .9%
Source: The Hokkaido Project, 1996
The data presented in the Table 26 show that the Hungary scores much lower in 
‘internal transformation measure’ (36.7 per cent in Hungary compared to 63.3 per cent 
in Poland, 56.9 per cent in the Czech Republic and 56 per cent in Slovakia). This may 
be - at least - the result o f the combined effects of the below listed factors:
■ Hungarian firms in the machine industry are slightly ahead of other Visegrad 
countries’ firms in transforming their companies, because the important re-organisation 
of management and organisation already have started as early as 1970’s and 
accelerated from die 1980’s. The evolutionary type of changes (or organisational 
mutatron) produced an institutional context where the „ boundaries between state 
and private property were being eroded in even the most advanced sectors of 
Hungarian manufacturing ... in the 1970’s and 1980’s industrial manufacturers 
operating in citres or industrialised regions, for example, typically externalised the 
simpler processes to remote villages.’ (Grabher, 1995:48-49.)
■ Strategic privatisation did create autonomous and 'real owners’ and 'real managers’ 
and between them visible decisional power: owners have the power to decide on key 
issues of ownership use (e.g., appointment o f directors, significant investment and 
dividing profit) and managers as a social-professional group decide on various issues 
of the firms’ operation (e.g., reorganisation, wage system, working conditions, hiring- 
firing personnel, etc.) These distinctive and clear roles between owners and mangers 
played a strong force in firm’s restructuring and profit motivation of the Hungarian 
managers. (Komai, 1996.)
■ The internal transformation process in the Hungarian firms was accelerated by the 
break-up of the COMECOM, the former socialist trading bloc. Hungary has not large 
internal market of Poland nor the long history of the export oriented machine industty, 
like the Czech Republic, (e.g., the famous Czech machine industry firm, Skoda has 
more than 40 joint-ventures and is active in the field of foreign investment, too.) 
(Kevin, 1996.) To illustrate the significant size of the Polish market, it is enough to
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mention that the GM low-cost family car, Opel Astra will be sold mainly (60 - 70 per 
cent) in Poland manufactured in die future GM plan in this country. But in the case of 
the ‘Opel Hungary Co. Ltd.1 only tiny minority of this model is sold in the country, but 
the Hungarian Opel will manufacture more then 400,000 car engines a year, and eveiy 
fifth Opel equipped by Hungarian-made engine.
Summing up, the Hungarian machine industry firms are in a slightly better 
position than other Visegrad countries in transforming their enterprises, because of 
their wider opportunities to leam in the former socialist past and also better because of 
the clearer possibilities to acquire new managerial methods and skill. The first result of 
an international research project (REGIS) - initiated by the £U - on the regional 
innovation system (Mako-Ellingstad-Kuczi, 1997, forthcoming) carried out in a region 
where the concenttation of foreign owned firms extremely high, lllustt'ates the ‘engine’ 
role of ‘foreign-owned’ firms (especially green-field sites) in diffusing new managerial 
concepts and practices. Their visible and significant activity in Hungary (see Chapters 
3 and 4) is important not only from the point of view of their economic performance 
(e.g., their share in export and GDP production) but also as they enlarge the ‘pool’ of 
the available ‘state of the art’ managerial skill and organisation.
The REGIS Project survey was earned out in the autumn of 1996 in one of the 
most economically dynamic regions o f Hungary, with managers surveyed given a list 
of organisational tools from ‘leading-edge’ concepts in management and asked which 
their company had introduced. There were some rather dramatic divergences between 
foreign-owned and Hungarian firms, but before we examine these, a short rhetorical 
detour is needed. When interpreting responses to questions such as ,Jiave you  
introduced TQM, JIT, IT, benchmarking, etc.?", we must also consider that 
unfamiliarity with the terminology does not necessary imply unfamiliarity with the 
functionality of the idea. At the core of some of these more fashionable concepts 
bandied about by the business press and western management consultants are to be 
found, veiy often, some very elementary ideas which one does not need to read the 
Harvard Business Revue to be familiar with. A Hungarian manager might reply „no,
we haven’t instituted an IT system yet”, while sitting at a desk with an integrated, 
networked computer.
TQM, for example, prescribes a set of procedures and a corporate mentality 
designed to make quality a given at every stage in the production and distribution 
process. (On the growing literature of TQM consult Logothetis, 1992.) While helpful 
in focusing attention on quality, it would be folly to suggest that a formalised TQM 
system is a prerequisite for higher quality. Group work found favour in the western 
business community after successful patterns were observed in Japan and Sweden, but 
it is a little known fact, for example, that formalised group work initiatives (with their 
own cost accounting structures, creating in effect, firm-internal profit centres) were 
institutionalised in Hungary as early as the mid-1970s (the so-called VGMK).(Stark, 
1985, Mako-Simonyi, 1992.) Furthermore, the „faddish” and occasionally temporary 
nature of some of the above-listed organisational tools or managerial concepts cause us 
to wonder if  their implementation or lack thereof is indeed a proper measure of 
managerial finesse. A study cited by the Financial Times comes to mind which 
revealed that British firms which had adopted JIT inventory control procedures had 
twice the rate of bankruptcy as „traditional” firms.
Tins said, the responses given to such questions can indeed be used as a useful 
tool in interpreting managerial priorities, as well as the dominant models (and sources 
of inspiration), present at firms in the region surveyed. Looking at the responses to all 
questions, foreign-owned companies returned average scores o f 45.8 per cent 
compared to 24.1 per cent for Hungarian firms. Particularly large differences are 
visible under TQM, Profit Centres, Benchmarking (ironic, as Hungarian and other 
CEE finns in the period of socialism generally worked under norms for decades), Flat 
hierarchies, Outsourcing, ISO, JIT, and IT. (See Table 27.)
Tabie27 Question: Has Your Company Introduced the Following?
Have your introduced? Hungarian owned firm Foreign owned firm
Total quality management 18.4% 37.5 %
Group work 55.1 % 66.7 %
Profit or cost centres 44,9 % 62.5 %
Inter-organisational networking 34.7 % 37.5 %
Benchmarking 4.1 % 37.5 %
Flat hierarchies 22.4 % 50.0 %
Interdisciplinary design teams 18.4% 33.3 %
Just in time delivery 10.2 % 41 .7%
Outsourcing 8.2 % 29.2 %
System suppliers 10.2 % 20.8 %
ISO 9000 34.7 % 62.5 %
Information technology 28.6 % 70.8 %
Source: Mako-Ellingstad-Kuczi (1997) 'REGIS: Szekesfehervar Survey Results and Interpretation".
January, p. 12. (Manuscript)
Finally, the importance of uneven development in the managerial labour process 
in creating managerial skill and even ‘habitus’ (in the sense used by Bourdieu) is often 
under-evaluated and the role o f the cultural differences is overrated, especially 
regarding the post-socialist countries. Evaluating the development o f new managerial 
methods and practices we question the explanatory value of the ‘cultural variable’ in 
explaining conflicts during the transfer o f managerial skill and organisation between 
the local and foreign managers. The cases of joint-ventures presented in this report 
underline the ‘colouring effect’ o f the national (or even corporate) cultures in 
comparison to the role o f the managerial labour process. Our experiences learned in 
evaluating the impacts of various ‘vehicles’ of managerial skill and organisation 
transfer (.e.g., western management consulting firms, joint ventures, various empirical 
. surveys on re-structuring organisation and ownership, etc.) question the validity of
overrating the role o f culture. In this regard, we fully agree with the following 
statement; „ managers in the area of strategic interest share goals and beliefs about 
what makes their business success more coherently and distinctively than any other 
group widiin the organisation. People within the area o f strategic interest but of 
different nationalities are more likely to share beliefs with each other than people of 
the same nationality but not in the area of strategic interest.” (Markoczy, 1996:10.)
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Conclusions
Evaluating a variety of experiences in relation with transferring management 
skill and organisation, it is worth signaling some lessons drawn from the past and 
present development of business organisations in Central Eastern Europe(CEE), and 
especially in Hungaiy. Our analysis is focused on the managerial labour process and 
such key related issues as changing or stable elements o f the managerial skills and 
organisation in the socio-economic transformation process o f post-socialist countries. 
The core motif in selecting for study these dimensions o f the managerial labour 
process was the relative lack of interest in understanding the role o f such key actors in 
the every-day life of institution building in transformation economies.)
In this effort, we tried to avoid both the ‘demoniac’ and ‘apologetic’ treatment of 
managers - which is often present in the sociological approaches - dealing with the 
role of the new (or renewed) business elite in new power structures. Our ambition was 
understand and evaluate the everyday social and organisational practice of the firm - as 
a key societal institution - both in the socialist and post-socialist political and 
economic regimes. In examining the various components o f the managerial labour 
process, we refused to use the clear-cut images of both the former socialist past and 
post-socialist present. The ‘rationalised myth’ approach hide the very complex nature 
of the institutional arrangements and does not help us to understand the sources of 
diversity in the institutional (and economic) development in the emerging market 
economies in the CEE countries.
One of the most important insights learned from more than a half decade 
experiences of this enormous transformational process is the very necessity to use the 
evolutionary interpretation o f  the socio-economic changes in opposition to the so- 
called 'big-bang' or ‘instant-capitalism  ' view. The emphasis on transformation, like its
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twin concept of ‘path-dependence’, relies heavily on past events in gauging the 
development of decision making process, patterns of behaviours etc. In this view, 
history matters. The path-dependent emergence of new forms of capitalism call our 
attention to the strong, future shaping influence of the former socialist practice in 
organising economic activities.
It is necessary to stress that in practice the socialist past did represent more than an 
amalgamation of different forms of regulation of economic activities than a single 
bureaucratic form of regulation. In spite of the fact that the countries belonging to the 
former world of existing socialism did share well-known core institutions (e.g. 
dommance of state ownership, ideological and political monopolies, central planning, 
etc.), it would be misleading to overestimate the level of institutional coherence in the 
post-socialist countries o f the CEE region. The erosion of the ‘soviet-type’ model of 
organising economic activity demonstrates well the diversity or combination of 
regulatory societal mechanisms m governing both individual and collective actions of 
various actors, as well as the weakness o f the core socialist institutions. Using the 
distinction between ‘systematic adjustment’ and ‘radical reforms’ launched in Hungary 
as early as 1970’s, the autonomy of social actors, including the company managers had 
mcreased markedly. These cumulative changes created a ‘hybrid-type’ o f system m 
regulating economic activities both at local (e.g. business organisations) and national 
level. Chapter 1 deals with the process of ‘hybridisation’ o f regulatory mechanisms of 
economic activity with planned economies. For example, the „intemal subcontracting 
groups” (VGMKs) introduced in the state companies could be qualified as one of the 
most interesting organisational and managerial innovations within the history of 
socialist economic policy.
The other general observation made on the transformation of the managerial 
labour process could be summarise thus: in the post-socialist countries of the CEE 
region, we may identify certain pattern o f  uneven development in creating knowledge 
and organisations (and thereby institutions) o f  the emerging market economies. This 
variety of development can not be understand without evaluating the pre-history of the
present transformational process. Our findings on the differing rates o f organisational 
restructuring and the related transfer of managerial skill in the post-socialist privatised 
firms question die validity of those views which treat the legacy of the socialist past as 
something which equivalent with institutional deficiency (pathological syndrome) of 
economic development. Evaluating systematically the impacts o f the „radical reform” 
initiated by social actors within the planned economy of Hungary, it is possible to 
identify such changes in the nature of managerial work and knowledge, which speeded 
up the adaptation of these actors to the new requirements o f the developing market 
economy. Chapter 3 focuses on the pre-privatisation modernisation of e n te rp rise  
structure (.e.g. the pioneer firms’ experiments with matrix-organisation, group 
activities, profit-centres etc.) and growing autonomy of management within the state 
owned firms (e.g. implementation of the Enterprise Councils, etc. ) have increased the 
importance of the managerial labour process within the frrm.
Finally, we may identify the visible pattern of uneven development in the post-socialist 
firms and management, too. In regards to this uneven development, it is worth listmg 
the following lessons drawn from the problems relating to managerial and 
organisational skill transfer:
1: Privatisation is an extremely important process m creating ‘real’ owners and 
managers m comparison with state socialism, where the state ownership was abstract 
and unable to produce a strong profit-orientation amongst managers and workers. 
Evaluating the impact of privatisation on the management and organisational 
restructuring in Chapter 3, we have to note that it is not privatisation per se that is 
important, but also the fi l te r s ' through which privatisation is experienced by the 
social actors ( owners, managers and workers, as well as their interest representative 
organisations). Among the institutional ‘filters’, Chapter 4 describes the role of the 
facilitators (e.g. co-operative patterns in firm level Labour Relations in Hungary) in 
introducing new managerial concepts and organisations.
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2: Evaluating the impacts of such tools of managerial skill and organisational transfer - 
such as Westem-management consulting firms, different types of international joint 
ventures etc. - it is necessary to call attention to the risk o f  the mechanical and 'under­
socialised' use o f  the notion o f  „ transfer". To understand the learning of new values 
and new patterns o f behaviour for both local and foreign managers and employees, it is 
necessary to treat managerial learning not only as a continuing process, but also as a 
multi-dimensional phenomena. Distinction can be made between techn ical- 
professional”, explicit forms versus „social-cultural” and tacit forms. Using this 
distinction in analysing the roles of vehicles (e.g. joint-ventures, consulting firms, FDI, 
etc.) in transferring managerial skills, we may signal the risks involved in usmg the 
concept of „transfer” without mentioning its social-cultural contexts.
According to the empirical experiences presented in Chapters 4 and 5, it is clear that 
even in the case of learning technical-professional” elements o f new managerial 
skills, die mechanic use o f transfer is not only misleading, but also hides the structural 
and subjective elements o f the managerial learning process. Due to its social-cultural 
embeddedness, even the technical-professional ingredients o f managerial skill could be 
acquired via manual learning and the careful re-balancing of social relations in 
business relations. For instance, the examples on how to fit the new managerial 
concepts with the impact of the organisational legacy of the past illustrate well the 
importance of embeddedness, which refers to the fact that all social action and 
outcomes (like economic actions and outcomes) are affected by actors’ dyadic 
relations and by the structure of overall network relations. (Grabher, 1993, Kuczi- 
Mako, 1997.)
3. Concerning the tempo of the transformation process itself, we have to repeat again 
the very uneven development of managerial skill and organisation, and their impacts 
on the outcomes of the transformation. Outside the undeniable dependence on past 
events (path-dependence) it is necessary to call attention the new model-creator 
roles of such actors as foreign-owned firms, especially the norm-setting role of 
greenfield investments o f multinational companies. According to our experiences,
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greenfield sites function as accelerators of the diffusion of new managerial concepts 
and practices. It is empirically tested in the Hungarian case (see Chapter 5 for 
details) that in the foreign-owned firms, leadmg-edge concepts o f management (e.g. 
TQM, benchmarking, JIT, flat organisation, outsourcing, IT, etc.) were adopted at a 
much higher rate than in Hungarian-owned firms. The uneven development of 
managerial skills could be identified not only within one country (e.g. Hungary), but 
also among other CEE countries. The variations in development trajectories are also 
reflected in economic performances (e.g., labour productivity).
Finally, from the point o f view of future research on roles of such key actors in the 
transformation process, it is necessary to raise some methodological shortcomings in 
the present state of knowledge. Firstly, there are relatively few comparative studies 
using commonly developed research design and the set o f  research instruments to 
guarantee the comparability o f the date collected. Secondly, even within the ideal 
circumstances of commonly elaborated research design and the standard use of 
research instruments, it is necessary to rely on the professional help o f local experts in 
interpreting not only the data, but also the concepts and categories used in the 
international comparative projects (e.g., some expressions or notion often have 
different meanings and stimuli in different countries). Thirdly, in analysing the trends 
and trajectories o f development in the post-socialist countries, the future projects have 
to focus on specific sectoral or regional level transformational process to reveal the 
extremely complex nature o f the socio-economic changes(Peng-Heath, 1996). The 
aggregated data often hide even the variety of forms of the privatisation process and 
the organisational changes, while the aggregated indicator o f privatisation - measured 
in employment share and GDP created by the private sector - are currently quite 
similar among the CEE countries, but the sectoral level surveys revealed noticeable 
differences both in the forms and outcomes of privatisation and organisational 
restructuring of the business organisations.
Summing up the core lessons o f our study on transferring managerial skill and 
organisation, we may certainly assert that in the „mutant” corporate structure
developing in the CEE countries - different from the share-based capitalism in the US 
and UK and die bank-based capitalism of western Europe - our systematic knowledge 
on the changing labour process o f such key actors as managers is still very limited. For 
the future research, it would be advisable to initiate more sector-focused comparative 
projects to understand the interaction between managerial roles, and the contextual 
institutions on the country concerned.
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